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THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF PROXY ACCESS 
Marcel Kahan∗ and Edward Rock∗∗ 
ROXY access is the right of shareholders to nominate directors 
and to have their nominees included in the company’s proxy 
statement. Because proxy access is viewed as dramatically lowering 
the costs of an election contest, both proponents and opponents of 
proxy access predict that it will have a significant impact. Contrary 
to this conventional wisdom, we argue that proxy access will lead to 
few shareholder nominations, that most of these nominees will be 
defeated, and that the occasional nominee who may get elected will 
have little impact. 
Based on past involvement in shareholder activism, we believe 
that neither mutual funds nor private pension funds would make 
significant use of proxy access. Certain large public pension funds 
have shown a modest interest in activism and may make some 
nominations. The entities with the greatest interests in activism—
hedge funds and union-affiliated funds—would generally not satisfy 
the ownership and holding period requirements. 
When compared to traditional proxy contests and to withhold 
campaigns, proxy access involves significant disadvantages while 
promising only modest advantages. The cost savings of proxy access 
compared to traditional contests are overstated because most proxy 
contest expenses are discretionary campaign expenses or relate to 
other expense items that are unaffected by the proxy access rule. By 
contrast, the limitations that come with proxy access are significant: 
the number of nominees a shareholder can propose is limited; the 
level of shareholder support required to gain a seat, as a practical 
matter, is increased; the company retains control over the design of 
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the proxy cards; and the company retains exclusive access to pre-
liminary voting information. 
When compared to withhold-vote campaigns, proxy access has the 
advantage that, if it succeeds, it results in the election of a dissident 
director. But this benefit must be weighed against countervailing fac-
tors that reduce the likelihood of success: the higher level of share-
holder support required for success, the greater challenge of positive 
versus negative campaigning, and the vulnerability of the dissident 
shareholders and their nominees to attacks by the company for lack 
of qualification or conflicts of interest. Such attacks will resonate es-
pecially for nominees by unions and public pension funds and may 
make it difficult to find qualified nominees. 
Overall, we believe that proxy access would have some undesir-
able effects—it would result in some increase in company expenses 
and may, rarely, increase the leverage of shareholders whose inter-
ests conflict with those of shareholders at large—and some desirable 
effects—it may occasionally lead to the election of nominees to re-
calcitrant boards, where such nominees may have a modest impact 
on governance and a marginal impact on company value. None of 
these effects is likely to be very material, and the net effect is likely to 
be close to zero. 
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Should shareholders in publicly traded corporations have the 
right to have their nominees to the corporate board included in the 
proxy statement and ballots mailed out by the company and at the 
company’s expense? The highly controversial question has long 
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been at the forefront of the corporate governance debate. The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) first considered pass-
ing rules 60 years ago, and has since released several proposals.1 
But although there is significant disagreement among observers 
over whether such “proxy access” is desirable, there appears to be 
a widespread expectation that proxy access would have major ef-
fects on corporate governance. Thus, John G. Finley, formerly a 
partner at Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett and now Senior Managing 
Director and Chief Legal Officer at Blackstone, remarked that 
proxy access is “the biggest change relating to corporate govern-
ance ever proposed by the SEC.”2 John Greenwald, in Corporate 
Board Member magazine, opined that “few things make boards 
more nervous” than proxy access.3 The Chamber of Commerce 
viewed proxy access as “extremely significant” and having “enor-
mous impacts”4 and included killing it among its top 5 priorities.5 
David Katz and Laura McIntosh, two lawyers at Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz, see proxy access as having the “potential to wreak 
havoc with American business”6 and an SEC adoption as “unwise 
and unnecessary.”7 Michael Garland of CtW Investment Group, a 
proxy advisory firm, called proxy access a “new and powerful 
tool.”8 The Deal Magazine notes that proxy access would make it 
“dramatically less expensive[] for shareholders to nominate direc-
 
1 See Yin Wilczek, In Historic Rulemaking, SEC Allows Investors to Access Proxies 
to Nominate Directors, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), 1617, 1621 (Aug. 30, 2010). 
2 John Greenwald, Hang On, 13 Corp. Bd. Member, First Quarter 2010, at 22, 24. 
3 Id. 
4 Sarah N. Lynch, Business Groups Gear Up To Fight SEC Proxy Access Proposal, 
Dow Jones Newswires, Aug. 18, 2009, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
DJ00000020090818e58i000aq (quoting Tom Quaadman, Executive Director at the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
5 Kara Scannell, Proxy Plan Roils Talks on Finance Rules, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 2010, 
at A2. 
6 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Senate Bill Adversely Affects the Land-
scape, N.Y. L.J., May 27, 2010, at 5. 
7 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Populists’ Wish Lists Offer Legislative Pa-
rade of Horribles, N.Y. L.J., July 23, 2009, at 5; see also David A. Katz & Laura A. 
McIntosh, Proxy Access: Not Then, Not Now, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 28, 2006, at 5; David A. 
Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, SEC Revisits Shareholder Access to Director Nomina-
tions, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 2007, at 5. 
8 Joann S. Lublin, New Rule on Proxies Puts Heat on Firms, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 
2010, at B1. 
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tors.”9 Brian Cartwright, the former general counsel of the SEC, 
regards proxy access as a “grand experiment in politicizing the 
leadership” of U.S. corporations.10 The Wall Street Journal has 
called it a “high-stakes issue”11 and headlined that proxy access 
would “put[] heat on firms.”12 Others call proxy access either 
“groundbreaking”13 and “historic,”14 or “fatally flawed”15 and “a gi-
ant step backwards.”16 Some predict that proxy access would result 
in a “profound effect on the boardroom”17 and help “restore share-
holder confidence”;18 others predict that it would “handcuff 
boards,”19 generate a “fair amount of litigation,”20 and occupy the 
SEC for “years to come.”21  
On August 25, 2010, it looked like proxy access was about to be-
come a reality. The Securities and Exchange Commission, over 
heavy opposition by corporations and after a close vote along par-
tisan lines, finally adopted a rule granting shareholders proxy ac-
cess.22 But the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Com-
merce promptly filed suit to enjoin and invalidate the rule.23 On 
 
9 Steven Epstein & Matthew Soran, Uncle Sam: A Most Effective Shareholder Ac-
tivist?, TheDeal.com (July 13, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/
community/uncle-sam-a-most-effective-shareholder-activist.php. 
10 Editorial, Alinsky Wins at the SEC, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 2010, at A14. 
11 Scannell, supra note 5, at A2 (discussing Congressional response to the proxy ac-
cess legislation). 
12 Lublin, supra note 8, at B1. 
13 Wilczek, supra note 1, at 1623. 
14 Id. at 1621. 
15 Id. at 1622 (quoting SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey). 
16 Id. at 1623 (quoting U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
17 David Calusdian, Proxy Access: Time to Get Ready for Profound Changes, The 
Podium (Nov. 18, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://blog.investorrelations.com/2009/11/18/proxy-
access-time-to-get-ready-for-profound-changes. 
18 Walter Calls for Action on Proxy Access, Disclosure, Other Governance Topics, 
Corporate Law Daily (BNA) (Feb. 19. 2009), http://0-news.bna.com.pacman.law.
du.edu/cldn/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=14113940 (attributing phrase 
to SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter). 
19 Wilczek, supra note 1, at 1623 (quoting Business Roundtable). 
20 Id. at 1622 (quoting John Olson, a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP). 
21 Id. (quoting SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey). 
22 See Wilczek, supra note 1, at 1621. 
23 Petition for Review at 2, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 
2010). The SEC agreed to stay the effectiveness of the proxy access rules pending 
resolution of the lawsuit. See U.S. Chamber and Business Roundtable Commend 
SEC’s Decision to Grant Stay on Proxy Access Rule, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
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July 22, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit va-
cated the proxy access rule due to the SEC’s failure to assess its 
economic effects adequately.24 As of this writing, the SEC has yet 
to determine whether to appeal the court decision, revise or reissue 
the rule after performing the missing analysis, or drop its effort to 
grant proxy access.  
In this Article, we will argue that, contrary to the views ex-
pressed by the commentators, proxy access would have little im-
pact on corporate governance. Even if the SEC’s rule is ultimately 
validated or a different rule is adopted, few shareholders would use 
proxy access to make nominations, very few of the nominees would 
succeed in getting elected to boards, and the rare nominee who 
does get elected would make little difference on the way compa-
nies are run and would have even less of an effect on company 
value. While the specifics of our analysis consider the rule adopted 
by the SEC in 2010, our general arguments apply to any revised 
rule that may be adopted by the SEC, which is likely to be nar-
rower than the 2010 rule, as well as to the prior proposals, some of 
which were broader than the 2010 rule.  
Rather, the whole concept of proxy access, in our view, is based 
on a fallacy: the erroneous belief that it is the costs associated with 
distributing a proxy statement that accounts for the failure of 
shareholders to wage more successful proxy contests. Accordingly, 
all the effort that shareholder activists have poured into proxy ac-
cess, even if they ultimately succeed in getting a valid rule adopted, 
will be wasted. 
In Part I of this Article, we discuss the history of the proxy ac-
cess rule, describe the rule adopted by the SEC in greater detail, 
and place it in the context of some other recent developments re-
lated to the shareholder franchise. Part II analyzes the status quo 
of contested and uncontested shareholder votes and examines what 
type of shareholders are likely both to satisfy the qualifications for 
making proxy access nominations and to be interested in engaging 
in activism via proxy access. Parts III and IV assess the advantages 
and disadvantages of proxy access relative to, respectively, tradi-
 
(Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2010/october/us-chamber-
and-business-roundtable-commend-secs-decision-grant-stay-prox. 
24 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14988 (D.C. Cir. 
July 22, 2011). 
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tional proxy contests and withhold votes. In Part V, we discuss the 
marginal impact proxy access would have on corporate govern-
ance. We close with a brief conclusion. 
I. THE HISTORY OF PROXY ACCESS 
A. History 
The recently enacted, and for the time being vacated, rules on 
proxy access are the product of a long and tortured history. In 
1942,25 and then again in 1977,26 the SEC expressed some interest in 
giving shareholders the opportunity to use the company’s proxy 
materials to solicit votes in director elections, but ended up taking 
no action. Things started heating up in 2003, when the SEC again 
issued a proposal on proxy access for comments. Under the 2003 
proposal, shareholders would obtain proxy access for the two years 
following a triggering event—either a 35% or more “withhold” 
vote in a director election or a majority vote by shareholders elect-
ing to make the company subject to proxy access.27 Under that pro-
posal, shareholders who held at least 5% of the company’s stock 
for a minimum of 2 years would have been able to make nomina-
tions for some of the board seats.28 
From its beginning, the 2003 proposal was highly controversial. 
It was initially adopted by a vote of 3-2, with the Republican 
 
25 See Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, 
H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 78th Cong. 17–19 (1943) (testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell that the SEC 
solicited comments on staff proposal); Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act 
Release No. 3347, Holding Company Act Release No. 3988, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 417 (Dec. 18, 1942) (stating that “[a] number of the suggestions pro-
posed by the staff were not adopted,” including the suggestion related to shareholder 
access to the company’s proxy material). No action was taken. 
26 Staff of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rep.: Review of the Proxy 
Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors 3 (July 15, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf. 
27 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,790, 60,791 (Oct. 23, 
2003), reprinted in [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 
88,409, 88,410 (Oct. 14, 2003).  
28 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,794 (Oct. 23, 2003), re-
printed in [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 88,413–
88,414 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
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Chairman Donaldson siding with the two Democratic commission-
ers.29 The Business Roundtable (an association of CEOs of leading 
U.S. companies) and the Chamber of Commerce were strongly op-
posed.30 Donaldson ended up not pushing for an adoption of the 
proxy rules and resigned in 2005.31 His successor, Christopher Cox, 
was not regarded as a champion of proxy access, and proxy access 
was considered dead. 
Dissatisfied champions of proxy access therefore decided to 
adopt an alternative strategy. In 2005, the American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) made a 
shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8 to American International 
Group (AIG) seeking to implement a homemade proxy access re-
gime through a bylaw amendment.32 The SEC’s Division of Corpo-
rate Finance took the position that AIG could omit this proposal 
under Rule 14a-8(i)(8).33 AIG did, and AFSCME sued. In 2006, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the pro-
posal could not be excluded.34 In its opinion, the court was highly 
critical of the SEC, berating it for changing its position on the 
meaning of its rules without either acknowledging so or explaining 
the reasons for it.35 The Court of Appeals’s ruling meant that the 
SEC had to act, both to clarify its rules and to remedy the short-
comings the court had noted. 
And act it did—sort of. In July 2007, the SEC released for com-
ment two alternative proposals. One resembled the 2003 proxy ac-
cess proposal. The other would have provided a reasoned basis for 
the position that a shareholder proposal trying to implement proxy 
 
29 See Jonathan Peterson, SEC Offers Conflicting Shareholder Proposals, L.A. 
Times, July 26, 2007, at C3 (stating that Chairman Donaldson and the SEC’s Democ-
ratic commissioners supported the SEC’s 2003 proposal). 
30 See Bill Baue, Opening Up Pandora’s Box: SEC Proxy Roundtable Questions 
Role of Non-Binding Resolutions, SocialFunds (May 15, 2007), 
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2293.html (“The SEC allowed the rule it 
proposed in October 2003, allowing shareowners proxy access to nominate directors 
in certain circumstances, to die on the vine due to opposition by the Business Round-
table and the US Chamber of Commerce, which threatened a lawsuit.”). 
31 Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.’s Chairman is Stepping Down from Split Panel, N.Y. 
Times, June 2, 2005, at A1. 
32 AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
33 Id. at 124. 
34 Id. at 129–30. 
35 Id. at 129. 
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access for a single company can be excluded under Rule 14a-8. 
Each proposal was supported by only 3 of the 5 commissioners—
the first by the 2 Democratic commissioners and Chairman Cox, 
the second by Cox and the 2 other Republican commissioners.36 In 
November 2007, the 3 Republican commissioners adopted the sec-
ond proposal.37 
A year later, Barack Obama was elected President. Cox resigned 
and was succeeded by Mary Schapiro.38 With Cox having been re-
placed by an Obama nominee, the SEC, in June 2009, released an-
other variant of a proposed proxy access rule—again in a 3-2 vote.39 
The 2009 proposal was broader than the 2003 proposal: it removed 
the requirement of a triggering event, it lowered the percentage 
ownership requirement for making a nomination to 1%–5%, de-
pending on company size, and it shortened the required holding 
period to 1 year.40 Predictably, reactions were mixed, with some 
groups strongly opposed and others strongly in favor. But even 
some of the market participants who favored proxy access in gen-
eral suggested that the 2009 proposal be made more restrictive.41 
For example, in its comment letter to the SEC, Barclays Global In-
vestors, a major institutional holder that manages $1.5 trillion in 
assets, favored both the reintroduction of the triggers in the 2003 
 
36 See Nicholas Rummell, SEC Splits Proxy Access Votes as Cox Says ‘Yea’ to Two 
Proposals, Fin. Wk. (July 25, 2007, 6:11 PM), http://www.financialweek.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070725/REG/70725013/1036 (describing how the first 
proposal would allow shareholders to put forth proxy proposals calling for bylaw 
changes to allow shareholder-approved directors during corporate elections and how 
the second would restate the SEC’s position prior to the Second Circuit’s invalida-
tion). 
37 L. Reed Walton, The SEC Denies Proxy Access, RiskMetrics Group Blog (Nov. 
30, 2007, 10:33 AM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2007/11/the-sec-denies-proxy-
accesssubmitted-by-l-reed-walton-publications.html. 
38 See Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Regulator Schapiro to Run SEC for Obama, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A1. 
39 Georgeson Inc. & Latham & Watkins LLP, Proxy Access Proposed Rules Pub-
lished by SEC, Corp. Governance Comment. (June 15, 2009), 
http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/corp_gov_commentary.html. 
40 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046, 
Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74 
Fed. Reg. 29,032, 29,037, 29,063 (June 18, 2009). 
41 See generally Corporate Law Daily (BNA) (Aug. 20. 2010), available at 
http://news.bna.com/cldn/CLDNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=17646623&vname=ccdb
ulallissues&fn=17646623&jd=a0c4a1c0v3&split=0 (noting that institutional investors 
favor a 3% threshold). 
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proposal and an increase in the ownership threshold needed to 
make a nomination to 5%–15%, depending on the company’s 
market capitalization.42 T. Rowe Price Associates, a mutual fund 
complex with about $190 billion in assets, favored a 5% ownership 
threshold for all companies, noting that it owned more than 5% of 
the stock in more than 350 U.S. operating companies.43 Moreover, 
managerial interests raised the argument that the proposed rule 
exceeded the SEC’s rulemaking authority.44 
To insulate any rule against such a legal attack, the SEC delayed 
action until Congress, as part of the financial reform bill, granted 
the disputed authority to the SEC.45 President Obama signed the 
finance reform bill on July 21, 2010, and the SEC adopted the 
proxy access rule on August 25, 2010. Under the adopted rule, the 
ownership requirement was set at a uniform level of 3% for all 
companies.46 Shareholders can pool their shares to form a group 
that satisfies the ownership threshold. If more than 10 other share-
holders are solicited in the effort to form such a group, the solicit-
ing shareholder must file a disclosure statement with the SEC. The 
3% ownership requirement must be satisfied as of the date the 
nomination is made and for the preceding 3 years.47 Since nomina-
tions must be made no later than 120 days before the anniversary 
of the company’s mailing of the previous year’s proxy statement,48 
and the nominating shareholders must intend to maintain their 
 
42 Annette L. Nazareth, SEC Urged to Defer Adopting Proxy Access Rules, Harv. 




44 See Kevin Drawbaugh, US CEO Lobby Doubts SEC Authority on Proxy Access, 
Reuters, Jan. 16, 2004; Rachelle Younglai, SEC Aims for Proxy Access Rules in 2nd 
Quarter, Reuters, Apr. 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE63Q47T20100427. 
45 See Jeff Morgan, SEC Proxy Access Vote Delayed Until Early 2010, National In-
vestor Relations Institute (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.niri.org/Main-Menu-Category/
advocate/Presidents-Note/SEC-Proxy-Access-Vote-Delayed-Until-Early-2010.aspx. 
46 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(1) (2010). However, for very small issues (with a public 
float of less than $75 million), the effective date of the rule was delayed for 3 years. 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Ex-
change Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 
Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
47 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(2) (2010). 
48 Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(10). 
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ownership until the date of the meeting,49 the rule effectively im-
poses a 3-and-1/3-year holding period on nominating shareholders. 
As in the proposed rule, nominations may only be made for up to 
25% of the board seats. No nominations may be made by a share-
holder who seeks to change control of the company or to gain a 
number of seats in excess of the maximum permitted by the rule.50 
A nominee’s candidacy may not violate the law or any stock ex-
change rules, the nominee must meet stock exchange rule inde-
pendence criteria, and the nominating shareholder must file a new 
Schedule N containing certain disclosures.51 
Promptly after the proxy access rule was adopted, the Business 
Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce filed suit to enjoin and 
invalidate it.52 On July 22, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit vacated the proxy access rule, holding that the rule was 
“arbitrary and capricious” due to the SEC’s failure to assess its 
economic effects adequately.53 As of this writing, the SEC has yet 
to determine whether to appeal the ruling, revise or reissue the 
rule after performing the missing analysis, or drop its effort to 
grant proxy access. But given the checkered history of proxy ac-
cess, we would be surprised if the Court of Appeals opinion pre-
sented the last word in this long saga. 
B. Other Developments 
Between 2003, when the Donaldson commission released its 
proxy access proposal, and 2010, when the Schapiro commission 
adopted its variant of proxy access, several notable developments 
occurred. Shareholders realized the power they can wield by “just 
voting no.” Many companies switched their election regime from 
 
49 Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(5). 
50 Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(6). 
51 Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(8)–(10). The requirements of Schedule N are further discussed 
at Table 4, infra. 
52 Petition for Review at 2, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 
2010). The SEC has agreed to stay the effectiveness of the proxy access rules pending 
resolution of the lawsuit. See U.S. Chamber and Business Roundtable Commend 
SEC’s Decision to Grant Stay on Proxy Access Rule, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2010/october/us-chamber-
and-business-roundtable-commend-secs-decision-grant-stay-prox. 
53 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14988 (D.C. Cir. 
July 22, 2011).  
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plurality voting to some form of majority voting. Discretionary 
broker voting in director elections was eliminated. And finally, 
Delaware law was clarified to permit shareholders to adopt tailor-
made, firm-specific proxy access rules. These developments have 
reduced—in our view, significantly—the impact, usefulness, and 
need for a federal rule on proxy access. In this Section, we describe 
these developments in greater detail. 
In uncontested director elections—and the overwhelming major-
ity of elections are uncontested—the only choice for shareholders 
who do not want to vote for a board nominee is to mark their 
proxy card (or voting instruction form) to withhold authority to 
vote for the director at issue. Shareholders have long had the abil-
ity to return a proxy card but withhold the vote for a director. Until 
recently, however, shareholders have taken little note of it. 
The intellectual origin of shareholders withholding their votes 
lies in a 1990 presentation to large institutional investors by former 
SEC Commissioner, and then-professor at Stanford law, Joe 
Grundfest. Grundfest proposed that shareholders “just vote no” in 
director elections.54 Though under the plurality voting system that 
prevailed at the time, withhold votes would have no legal effect no 
matter how many were cast,55 he argued that the symbolic impact of 
withhold votes, especially when coupled with shareholder commu-
nications with management, could act as an annual referendum on 
managerial performance and “be a catalyst for improved oversight 
that would benefit all corporate constituencies, as well as the econ-
omy at large.”56 In particular, Grundfest expected that 
 [a] successful “just vote no” campaign can induce internal re-
forms as a result of social pressures that lead board members to 
engage in more effective monitoring. Alternatively, a substantial 
“just vote no” turnout can increase the probability of a hostile 
proxy contest or tender offer that will be treated more kindly by 
 
54 Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Bar-
barians Inside the Gates, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 867 (1993). 
55 As discussed below, in an uncontested election under plurality voting, each nomi-
nee is elected as long as she receives a single affirmative vote. See infra text accompa-
nying note 190. 
56 Grundfest, supra note 54, at 866. 
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the courts precisely because it follows a significant “just vote no” 
turnout.57 
Although there was some early enthusiasm for the initiative,58 it 
took a number of years before Grundfest’s proposal caught on. 
The turning point probably was in the 2004 Disney board election,59 
when 45% of the shares were withheld from Disney CEO Michael 
Eisner.60 This campaign was highly publicized for a variety of rea-
sons: it involved a large entertainment company; it pitted Eisner 
against Roy Disney, the nephew of the legendary founder of the 
company; and Roy Disney spent more than $2 million in campaign-
ing for shareholders to vote “no.”61 Even though Eisner received a 
majority of the votes cast, the board of Disney immediately 
stripped him of his position as chairman62 and Eisner resigned as 
CEO the following year.63 The Disney withhold campaign showed 
shareholders that, in the right circumstances, a high withhold vote 
is both achievable and effective in inducing governance changes. 
In the wake of the rise of withhold campaigns, it also dawned on 
shareholders that there is something wrong with an election system 
in which a director can be elected even if a large majority of share-
holders is opposed. As a result, shareholders began pushing for 
some form of majority voting. It seems that the arguments against 
plurality voting struck a chord. Within a short span, most large 
companies discarded the old plurality voting regime and adopted 
 
57 Id. at 927. 
58 Id. at 866–67 & n.33 (citing press reports commenting on the increased popularity 
of the initiative). 
59 See Andrew Countryman, Shareholders Renewing “Just Vote No” Campaigns, 
Chi. Trib., Feb. 11, 2005, § 3, at 4 (quoting Patrick McGurn, a corporate governance 
expert at Institutional Shareholders Service, as saying “[w]ithhold-vote campaigns 
came of age in 2004, and they emerged as the dominant tactic for shareholder activ-
ists . . . .”). 
60 See Laura M. Holson & Geraldine Fabrikant, Disney Chief to Leave, Setting Off 
Race for Job, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2004, at C3. 
61 See Matt Kelly, Proxy Access Update: A Review of Likelihood, Costs, Compli-
ance Wk. (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.complianceweek.com/article/1219/proxy-access-
update-a-review-of-likelihood-costs.  
62 See Steven J. Spencer & Young J. Woo, Considerations for “Just Vote No” Cam-




63 See Exit Eisner, L.A. Times, Sept. 30, 2005, at B10. 
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some form of majority voting. Thus, the percentage of S&P 500 
companies with some form of majority voting increased from 16% 
in February 2006 and 66% in November 200764 to about 80% in 
2010.65 S&P 500 companies account for about 75% of the aggregate 
capitalization of the U.S. stock market.66 Among smaller compa-
nies, majority voting so far remains much less prevalent: of 5930 
companies outside the S&P 500 that are followed by RiskMetrics, 
only 17% had adopted some form of majority voting by 2009.67 But 
still, it is clear that majority voting has been a big success, is already 
in effect for a majority of U.S. companies when weighted by capi-
talization, and is likely to be adopted by many more companies in 
future years. 
A third change occurred with respect to the ability of brokers to 
vote shares held in their customers’ brokerage accounts. Most indi-
vidual shareholders in the U.S. hold their shares through brokers 
and are not the record holders of those shares.68 When a company 
solicits proxies, it sends proxy materials to the brokers, which then 
forward them to their customers together with a form on which the 
customers can mark voting instructions.69 If the customer does not 
return these instructions, and the issue is designated as “routine” 
by the NYSE, the broker can vote the uninstructed shares in its 
discretion—which usually means in accordance with management 
recommendations.70 
 
64 Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, Neal, Gerber & 
Eisenberg, LLP i (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy
111207.pdf. 
65 See Press Release, California Public Employees’ Retirement System, CalPERS 
2010 Majority Vote Initiative Successful at Top Companies (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-archive/pr-2010/dec/2010-
majority-vote.xml. 
66 See Data Series: SP500, S&P 500 Index, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Jul. 
26, 2010, 10:01 AM ), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/SP500. 
67 See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access De-
bate, 65 Bus. Law. 329, 343 (2010) (citing figures supplied to the authors by RiskMet-
rics). 
68 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 
Geo. L.J. 1227, 1237 (2008) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Hanging Chads]. 
69 Id. at 1243–48 (describing the process of how nominee shares are voted). 
70 Id. at 1250. 
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Until 2010, all uncontested director elections were treated as 
routine71—including the Disney board election in 2004 and subse-
quent elections in which active withhold campaigns were waged. 
As of January 1, 2010, the NYSE no longer treats any director elec-
tion as routine.72 As a result, when a shareholder does not return 
voting instructions to the broker, these shares are not voted in the 
election of directors. 
Finally, while proxy access was waxing and waning at the SEC, 
Delaware law made clear that shareholders had broad powers to 
adopt bylaws governing proxy access. In 2008, the Delaware Su-
preme Court held in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension 
Plan73 that provisions facilitating the nomination of director candi-
dates by shareholders can be included in bylaws—which can be 
adopted by shareholders without board approval74—and need not 
be included in the certificate of incorporation (which can only be 
changed upon a board recommendation).75 The following year, the 
Delaware legislature adopted a new Section 112 that explicitly al-
lows corporations to adopt proxy access via bylaw.76 Under that 
section, the bylaws may provide that individuals nominated by a 
stockholder will be included in the corporation’s proxy solicitation 
materials and its form of proxy, subject to the procedures and con-
 
71 NYSE Rule 451, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2451 (Dec. 2009); NYSE Rule 452, 2 
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2452 (Dec. 2009). Since NYSE exchange rules effectively 
govern all brokers, this rule applies to all publicly traded companies, regardless of 
where their stock is listed for trading. 
72 See Julie Connelly, What the Amended Rule 452 Means to You, Corp. Bd. Mem-
ber, Third Quarter 2009, available at http://www.boardmember.com/
MagazineArticle_Details.aspx?id=3880 (explaining the change in NYSE Rule 452 and 
ramifications for director elections). 
73 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008). 
74 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(a) (Supp. 2010). 
75 See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: 
Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 495–96 
(2003) (distinguishing between unilateral and bilateral governance changes). 
76 H.R. 19, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009); see also Comment Letter 
from James L. Holzman, Chair, Council of the Corp. L. Section of the Del. Bar Ass’n, 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exchange Commission 4 (July 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf. For an analysis of 
the jurisdictional interaction between Delaware and the federal government regard-
ing proxy access, see Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and its Political 
Economy, in Delaware and in Washington (Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 
2011-94, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1884110. 
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ditions provided in the bylaw. These conditions may include a 
minimum level or duration of ownership, submission of specified 
information, and limitations on parties seeking control. In princi-
ple, therefore, if a majority of shareholders of a company want 
proxy access, they have the power to adopt a proxy access bylaw, at 
least in most Delaware companies.77 Unlike the SEC’s proxy access 
rule, Section 112 embodies an “enabling” approach to corporate 
governance, as it permits each company to determine for itself 
whether to have proxy access, and if so, which shareholders should 
be eligible to make nominations, rather than imposing the same 
“one size fits all” approach on all companies.78 
II. THE STATUS QUO: UNCONTESTED AND CONTESTED 
PROXY SOLICITATIONS 
Before considering how proxy access may change the existing 
system, we need to describe briefly how the existing system works. 
 
77 Though Section 112 became effective in August 2009, we are not aware of any 
shareholder proposal during the 2010 proxy season that tried to use Section 112 to opt 
into a homemade proxy access rule. While this may indicate a lack of demand, it could 
also be due to the fact that shareholders’ rights advocates were awaiting the likely 
adoption of the SEC proxy access rule. Moreover, without changes in federal law, a 
proxy access rule under Section 112 would have created some tensions with the anti-
fraud provision in the proxy rules: to the extent that the company’s proxy statement 
includes information provided by a nominating shareholder, and that information is 
materially false or misleading, the company would have violated Rule 14a-9. The new 
federal proxy access rule makes it a violation for a nominating shareholder to cause a 
company to include materially false or misleading information regarding a proxy ac-
cess nomination under federal or state law, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2010), and ex-
culpates the company from any liability for false or misleading statements supplied by 
a nominating shareholder in Schedule 14N or otherwise, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(f) 
(2010). It is not entirely clear whether this exculpation applies to information fur-
nished under Section 112. However, prior to the adoption of the federal proxy access 
rule, the clear lack of any exculpation may have made a company wary of adopting 
proxy access under Section 112. 
78 The lack of any ability of companies to opt out of proxy access formed part of the 
basis for Commissioner Paredes’s opposition to the SEC’s approach. See, e.g., Troy 
A. Paredes, Comm’r, Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Speech at the 22nd Annual 
Tulane Corporate Law Institute (April 15, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch041510tap.htm). 
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A. Uncontested Solicitations 
There are approximately 6000 firms listed on the NYSE, the 
AMEX, and the NASDAQ, including foreign issuers.79 The Wil-
shire 5000 index, which now includes around 4000 companies,80 en-
deavors to cover the entire U.S. equity market and includes every 
equity security with its primary market listing in the U.S. It drops 
issues which stop trading for 10 consecutive days (which then are 
typically listed, if at all, on the “Pink Sheets”).81 Most of these 
companies hold shareholder meetings once a year and solicit prox-
ies for these meetings82 under the federal proxy rules.83 
All but a handful of these meetings are utterly routine. As one 
would predict, the solicitation of proxies for the uncontested an-
 
79 NYSE: 2600 listed operating companies, including 450 from outside the U.S. See 
A Guide to the NYSE Marketplace, NYSE Group 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nyse_bluebook.pdf. AMEX: 539 listed companies, includ-
ing closed-end funds and non-U.S. issuers. See NYSE and NYSE AMEX Equities 
Membership, NYSE Euronext, Inc., http://www.nyse.com/membership/equities/nyse 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2011). NASDAQ: 2852 listed companies as of December 31, 2009. 
See NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 18, 2010). 
Total: 6009 companies. 
80 Wilshire Fundamental Characteristics, Wilshire Indexes (April 29, 2011), 
http://web.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html.  
81 See Description of Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index, Wilshire Indexes, 
http://web.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/ (last visited May 17, 2011). The 
“Pink Quotations” or “Pink Sheets”—an electronic quotation system that displays 
quotes for typically inactively traded over-the-counter securities—are so called be-
cause the quotes were originally published on pink colored paper by the National 
Quotation Bureau (NQB). They are currently published by NQB’s successor, OTC 
Markets Group, Inc., which recently changed its name from Pink OTC Markets, Inc. 
See History of OTC Markets Group, OTC Markets, http://www.otcmarkets.com/
about/otc-markets-history (last visited May 17, 2011). 
82 We have described this complex system previously. See Kahan & Rock, Hanging 
Chads, supra note 68 at 1233–47. It is also the subject of a recent SEC release. See 
Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 62,495, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29,340, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 42,984 (July 22, 2010). 
83 Other estimates indicate that there are somewhere around 13,000 shareholder 
meetings for public companies per year at which around 600 billion shares are voted. 
2009 Proxy Season: Key Statistics & Performance Ratings, Broadridge Investor 
Communication Solutions 2 (2009), available at http://www.broadridge.com/investor-
communications/us/2009ProxyStats.pdf. The difference between the 13,000 estimate 
of meetings and the 6000–7000 estimate of public companies is probably due to (1) 
the fact that companies sometimes hold more than one meeting per year, (2) the in-
clusion of companies that trade only on pink sheets, and (3) the inclusion of invest-
ment companies in the former figure. 
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nual meeting is likewise fairly routine. Counsel for the company 
must produce a proxy statement that complies with the require-
ments of Schedule 14A. That proxy statement along with a proxy 
card—or, in the case of indirect holding, a request for instructions 
(a VIF or “voting instruction form”)—is then distributed to the 
shareholders, proxies and instructions are collected, votes are tabu-
lated, and the results are reported. 
Total costs of the annual proxy solicitation usually fall in the 
$10,000 to $100,000 range. For example, at Air Products & Chemi-
cals (market capitalization $15.4 billion), the 2010 annual proxy so-
licitation cost around $80,000, of which $35,700 was paid to 
Broadridge84 (covering the distribution to street holders, registered 
holders, and employee plan participants as well as hosting meeting 
materials on their website); $14,000 was paid to Morrow & Co. (for 
acting as proxy solicitor); and $30,000 was paid to RR Donnelley 
(for proxy printing and EDGAR preparation).85 The proxy state-
ment itself was produced in house. 
B. Contested Solicitations 
In contrast to the routine uncontested proxy solicitation for the 
annual meeting, a proxy contest for control, or even a “short slate” 
contest in which the dissidents seek to elect only a minority of di-
rectors, is much closer to a political campaign. It typically involves 
telephone solicitations, presentations to institutional investors, 
multiple mailings to shareholders, and sometimes newspaper ad-
vertisements and litigation. 
Contested solicitations are relatively infrequent. According to 
data compiled by Georgeson, a proxy solicitation firm, the number 
of contested solicitations from 1981 to 2009 has ranged from a low 
of 3 (in 1993) to a high of 57 (in 2009), with a general trend up-
wards beginning in the mid 1990s. Since there are over 6,000 pub-
licly traded companies, this means that over 99% of all votes are 
uncontested. In Table 1, we present data on the cost to dissidents 
 
84 Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”), formerly a unit of Automatic 
Data Processing, Inc. (“ADP”), is the market’s leading provider of investor commu-
nications, including proxy mailing and vote processing services. 
85 Email from John Stanley, General Counsel, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., to 
Marcel Kahan (July 30, 2010) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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and companies of waging a contest in 2009.86 Dissident costs varied 
widely, from a low of $30,000 to a high of $9 million for Ackman’s 
(unsuccessful) contested solicitation at Target. Unsurprisingly, 
costs tended to be higher for larger companies (as measured by 
their market capitalization) than for smaller ones. For companies 
with a capitalization of less than $300 million, the average (median) 
costs amounted to $267,000 ($200,000); for companies with a capi-
talization between $300 million and $1 billion, the average (me-
dian) costs amounted to $643,000 ($275,000); and for companies 
with a capitalization of above $1 billion, the average (median) costs 
were $2.17 million ($1.15 million). 
 





















Stytsenko  4 Directors * 30 1.30% Dissidents 
Asure Soft-
ware 
Red Oak/  
Pinnacle  





9 Directors 150 30 18.60% Settled 





17 Directors * 50 11.50% Dissidents 
Hooper 
Holmes, Inc. 
R. V.  
Aprahamian 
18 Directors 160 150 4.40% Dissidents 
VaxGen VaxGen Full Value Comm. 23 Directors * * * Mgmt 
Premier  
Exhibitions 
Sellers Cap. 35 
Consent 
to Elect  
Directors 
350 500 16.30% Dissidents 
Fauquier 
Bankshares 
D. M. Van 
Roijen 




86 We use the cost estimates provided by companies and challengers in their proxy 
statements, as required by Schedule 14A. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 4 (2010). 
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250 150 9.90% Settled 
ORBCOMM, 
Inc. 
John C.  
Levinson 
58 Directors 475 495 1.10% Withdrawn 
Trico Marine 
Services 
Kistefos AS 59 Directors 1200 1700 21.00% Mgmt 











64 Directors 875 450 21.10% Dissidents 
Tollgrade 
Comm. 




Inv. 71 Directors 250 350 6.30% Split 
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* 10 11.30% Dissidents 
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* 100 10.80% Dissidents 






* * * Dissidents 
IPC Holdings Validus  
Holdings 
<100 Call Sp. 
Meeting 


























445 415 5.90% Dissidents 








* 25 18.50% Settled 





119 Directors * 162.
5 
9.90% Dissidents 
CPI Corp Ramius LLC 122 Directors * 200 23.00% Mgmt 
Providence 
Service Corp. 










Fund 204 Directors * 100 25.90% Split 





304 Directors * 25 9.60% Mgmt 
Orthofix  
International 
Ramius LLC 308 Directors 650 250 5.50% Mgmt 
Orthofix  




* * 5.50% Dissidents 




700 275 10.90% Dissidents 
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399 Directors 1800 750 2.60% Withdrawn 












E. Dabah & 
Comm. 
908 Directors 1500 2350 21.80% Settled 
Emulex Corp. Broadcom 
Corp. 
922 Call Sp. 
Meeting 





960 Directors 1500 275 3.60% Mgmt 






1108 Directors 600 1000 10.20% Dissidents 
Amylin Icahn 1619 Directors/ 
Reincorp 
7000 650 9.20% Split/Mgmt 
Amylin Eastbourne 
Cap. 
1619 Directors 7000 2500 12.20% Split 
CF Industries 




250 1300 2.60% Mgmt 
NRG Energy Exelon 6227 Dir.; Exp. Board 3000 1300 0.00% Settled 
Biogen Idec Carl Icahn 14137 Directors 9200 1000 5.60% Split 
Target Corp. Pershing Square 34909 Directors 11100 9000 7.80% Mgmt 
* Not disclosed.  
Market capitalization “<100” is authors’ estimate. 
 
To examine contested solicitations more closely, we collected 
detailed information about all the contests waged between 2005 
and 2009 as listed by Georgeson,87 excluding contests that did not 
primarily involve the election of directors upon expiration of their 
terms, contests waged in connection with hostile takeover at-
 
87 See Georgeson, 2009 Annual Corporate Governance Review (2009), available at 
www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf. 
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tempts, and contests involving closed-end mutual funds.88 Our list 
consists of 129 contests. In about half of these contests (66), the 
dissidents obtained some board representation, either as a result of 
a ballot success or pursuant to a settlement.89 
Our analysis shows that most of the target companies involved in 
these proxy contests are small. Only 8 companies (6%) had a mar-
ket capitalization of more than $10 billion (a typical definition of 
large-cap), 9 had a capitalization of between $2 billion and $10 bil-
lion (mid-cap),90 and another 40 had a capitalization of between 
$300 million and $2 billion, a standard range for small-cap compa-
nies.91 About 60% of the companies (72) were micro-cap compa-
nies, with a capitalization of less than $300 million. The average 
and median capitalizations of these micro-caps were $93 and $66 
million. Though micro-cap companies also constitute a large frac-
tion of publicly traded companies, they account for less than 2.5% 
of the market capitalization of U.S. companies.92 
That proxy contests are overwhelmingly a phenomenon of small 
and very small publicly-held firms is important, but rarely noted in 
the extensive literature on proxy contests. Corporate law scholars 
often seem to think of publicly held firms as a unitary phenomenon 
and focus mainly on the larger capitalization firms. But when a 
company falls below the $300 million market cap, it is extremely 
difficult to attract attention from analysts or investors.93 These 
 
88 Contests about mergers, bylaw amendments, and director removal were excluded 
because proxy access would not be a vehicle through which such contests could be 
waged. Contests involving closed-end mutual funds were excluded because of the spe-
cial nature of these contests, which usually relate to the opening or liquidation of a 
fund. 
89 In 3 contests, no election was held for reasons such as a lack of quorum or the ac-
quisition of the company prior to the scheduled vote. 
90 Mid Cap, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/midcapstock.asp 
(last visited May 17, 2011). 
91 Small Cap, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/small-cap.asp (last 
visited May 17, 2011). 
92 See Russell 3000 Index, Russell Investments (Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://www.russell.com/indexes/data/fact_sheets/us/russell_3000_index.asp (stating 
that Russell 3000 companies account for 98% of the investible U.S. equities market). 
93 Justin Canivet, Small Cap Analyst Coverage: An “Under-the-Radar” Dilemma, 
Focus, Apr. 2009, at 4, available at www.world-exchanges.org/files/file/Focus%
200409.pdf. As Demiroglu & Ryngaert describe, 
 [i]n a press release dated July 7, 2005, Bob Greifeld, president and CEO of 
NASDAQ, noted that 35% of all publicly traded US firms had no analyst cov-
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firms are lucky if a single analyst follows them.94 With so little at-
tention, the market for such companies’ shares is far less informa-
tionally efficient than for mid-cap or large-cap companies.95 Simi-
larly, micro-cap companies present distinctive governance 
challenges. With most of the normal levers of accountability miss-
ing, many of them may be badly governed. 
In terms of dissidents, of the 129 contests, 86 were waged by 
hedge funds; of the rest, most were waged by an individual or a 
group of individual investors. Mutual funds, public pension funds, 
and private pension funds did not wage any of these contests. Dis-
sidents held on average 8.9% of the target company’s outstanding 
shares. In 100 of the 129 contests, the dissidents held more than 5% 
of the shares of the respective target company. Only 13 dissidents 
held less than 1% of the shares. This group includes 9 dissidents 
that held stakes with a dollar value below $150,000, all of whom 
lost. We regard such low percentage and dollar value contests as 
nuisance contests. Outside of nuisance contests, there is no strong 
correlation between dissident stakes and success. Thus, in the 15 
contests in which dissident stakes exceeded 15%, the dissidents 
won only 6 (40%), a success rate well below the sample average. 
Segregating the sample into micro-cap and regular-sized (that is, 
non-micro-cap) companies yields some further insights. Among 
regular-sized companies, hedge funds constituted 82% of the dissi-
 
erage. Additionally, he cited estimates by Reuters that from January 2002 to 
June 2005, 691 publicly traded US companies had lost all analysts’ coverage. 
Almost all of these companies had market capitalizations under $1 billion. 
Greifeld also noted “a lack of research coverage impacts company valuation, li-
quidity, and ultimately the welfare and growth of public companies.” 
Cem Demiroglu & Michael Ryngaert, The First Analyst Coverage of Neglected 
Stocks, 39 Fin. Mgmt. 555, 555 (2010) (quoting Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ 
and Reuters Launch New Venture to Help Companies Obtain Independent Analyst 
Coverage (June 7, 2005), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2005/
ne_section05_056.stm). 
94 Indeed, one concern with the 2003 analyst settlement was that the new rules 
would mean that many of the smaller firms would go from one analyst to zero. See 
Susanne Craig, Firm to Research Stock “Orphans,” Wall St. J., June 7, 2005, at C3 
(“Reuters found that since 2002, 691 companies have lost analyst coverage altogether. 
The hardest hit sector: Almost 99% of the companies that have lost coverage are 
smaller companies with a stock market value of less than $1 billion.”). 
95 See Demiroglu & Ryngaert, supra note 93, at 555, 567–69, 581 (documenting the 
price effects from the announcement of analyst coverage of a previously uncovered 
company). 
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dents, former insiders constituted 7%, and other dissidents consti-
tuted 11%. Among micro-caps, hedge funds accounted for only 
54% of the dissidents, former insiders for 18%, and other dissi-
dents for 28%. 
 
Table 2: Proxy Contests 2005-2009* 





























57 47 4 54% 56% 25% 0% 
*Derived from Georgeson, Annual Corporate Governance Review, 2005 to 2009 
 
As Table 2 shows, the overall success rate of the dissidents was 
similar in both groups. But this similarity masks important differ-
ences. Dissidents other than hedge funds had substantially higher 
success rates among micro-caps than among regular-sized compa-
nies, with former insiders doing better than other non-hedge fund 
dissidents. Hedge funds had high success rates in both groups, but 
accounted for a much larger fraction of the contests among regu-
lar-sized companies. Dissident stakes averaged 7.8% in regular and 
9.7% in micro-cap companies. In both sets of companies, former 
insiders had the highest average stake (9.2% and 16.6%, respec-
tively), followed by hedge funds (8.1% and 11%, respectively), and 
other dissidents (0.2% and 7.5%, respectively). 
In sum, only two types of dissidents showed meaningful success 
in waging proxy contests: hedge funds and, for micro-cap compa-
nies, former insiders. Other investors—including institutional in-
vestors other than hedge funds and individual investors other than 
former insiders—either never tried or rarely succeeded. 
C. Contested Lite: Shareholder Proposals 
Under Rule 14a-8, any shareholder who holds a mere $2,000 
worth of stock for one year can place a shareholder proposal in the 
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company’s proxy statement.96 Rule 14a-8 proposals may relate to 
many important corporate governance matters, but they cannot be 
used as a vehicle to make a nomination for a directorship.97 Given 
the trivial share ownership requirements and the short holding pe-
riod, especially compared to the (adopted as well as proposed) 
thresholds for proxy access, a large number of shareholders are eli-
gible to make Rule 14a-8 proposals. But most of them do not. 
Georgeson publishes an annual list of all corporate governance-
related proposals submitted at S&P 1500 companies. We examined 
the sponsors of the proposals for the five-year period 2005 to 2009 
to determine what shareholder types make the most use of Rule 
14a-8. In the 2005 to 2009 period, 1844 governance proposals were 
submitted. Of these, 47% were made by individual shareholders, 
39% by labor-affiliated groups (unions, union funds, and employee 
organizations), and 5% by public pension funds. 
 
Table 3: Governance Shareholder Proposal at S&P 1500* 
Sponsor 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Combined 
Total 375 384 375 339 371 1844 
Individuals 158 180 177 163 181 859 
Labor and Employee Groups 164 155 154 13 128 714 
AFL-CIO 20 4 16 13 17 70 
AFSCME 9 15 20 20 17 81 
UBCJA 49 64 43 20 27 203 
Public Pension Funds 15 19 19 19 25 97 
CalPERS 3 2 5 6 5 21 
NYC Pension Funds 0 9 10 10 11 40 
Hedge Funds 3 7 0 3 2 15 
Social Responsibility Funds 3 2 4 19 6 34 
Charities and Religious Groups 24 16 15 9 13 77 
Investment Managers 6 4 4 7 9 30 
TIAA-CREF 0 0 0 2 4 6 
*Derived from Georgeson, Annual Corporate Governance Review, 2005 to 2009 
 
What is notable about this listing is, again, the absence of any 
private pension fund and the virtual absence (with the partial ex-
 
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2010). 
97 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). 
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ception of TIAA-CREF, which manages both retirement and mu-
tual funds) of any mutual fund. Even public pension funds are un-
derrepresented, and virtually all of the proposals in that category 
are sponsored by a handful of funds: New York City Pension 
Funds (40); CalPERS (21); Connecticut Retirement Plans (11); 
Massachusetts Laborers’ Pension Fund (11); and New York State 
Retirement Fund (9). 
By contrast, entities with economic or ideological interests that 
may deviate from maximization of company value—labor affiliated 
groups, religious and other charities, and social-responsibility ori-
ented entities—are vastly overrepresented relative to their per-
centage shareholdings. As to the individual sponsors, a large per-
centage of proposals were made by a handful of individuals (such 
as John Chevedden, Gerald Armstrong, the Rossi family, and Eve-
lyn Davis) with usually minimal ownership stakes.98 
For most of these shareholder proposals, the proponent relies on 
the description of the proposal but engages in no outside cam-
paigning. Institutional shareholders are familiar with most types of 
proposals and often have developed policies on how they vote on 
them. Indeed, the proposals that receive majority shareholder ap-
proval tend to fall into a narrow set, which includes recommenda-
tions to destagger the board, establish majority voting, or eliminate 
supermajority voting. Occasionally, shareholder sponsors may 
campaign through public speeches, press releases, and advertise-
ments, which they can do without having to make any filings.99 
Very rarely, a sponsor also engages in a so-called exempt solicita-
tion under Rule 14a-2(b), which permits a shareholder to mail ma-
terials to other shareholders without filing a proxy statement as 
long as that shareholder does not furnish a proxy form and does 
not seek to act as a proxy, but it requires the filing of the mailed 
materials if the sponsor holds more than $5 million in shares.100 
 
98 See, e.g., FedEx Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 85–87 
(Aug. 16, 2010) (identifying shareholder John Chevedden as owner of 100 shares of 
FedEx stock); Bill Barrett Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 
46–47 (Apr. 9, 2010) (identifying shareholder Gerald Armstrong as owner of 100 
shares). 
 9917 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l) (2010). 
100 Id. §§ 240.14a-2(b)(1), 240.14a-6(g). In 2009, 15 shareholders engaged in such 
campaigns in favor of shareholder proposals. Seven of these campaigns were led by 
CalPERS. Most consisted of a single short mailing to shareholders. 
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Under that rule, shareholders may also engage in oral solicitations 
of other shareholders. Since most oral solicitations require no fil-
ings with the SEC,101 the exact number and scope of such solicita-
tions are unclear. We doubt, however, that many proponents, with 
the possible exception of TIAA-CREF and public pension funds, 
engage in widespread oral solicitations. 
D. Withhold Votes: Activism Without Activists 
A final, more recent form of election “contests” relates to with-
hold votes in director elections. According to Georgeson’s survey 
of S&P 1500 companies, there were 41 directors in 2010 who re-
ceived a majority withhold vote and 317 directors who received a 
withhold vote in excess of 30% of the votes cast.102 As described be-
low,103 many boards care about the percentage of withhold votes 
even if it does not affect the outcome of an election, and significant 
withhold votes often induce governance changes. Withhold votes 
thus represent an important form of shareholder activism. 
Peculiarly, however, it is unclear who the activists behind with-
hold votes are. Most large withhold votes occur in companies in 
which no filings were made by backers of a withhold vote.104 Thus, 
most large withhold votes are cast without any open campaigning. 
And, while it is true that most directors who receive large withhold 
votes received a withhold vote recommendation from ISS, the 
leading proxy advisor, it is equally true that most withhold recom-
mendations by ISS do not result in large withhold votes.105 More-
over, it is unclear whether an ISS withhold recommendation is the 
 
101 Moreover, under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b), shareholders are exempt from the 
rules requiring filling, except as provided under § 240.14a-6(g): 
[N]o . . . submission need be made with respect to oral solicitations (other than 
with respect to scripts used in connection with such oral solicitations), speeches 
delivered in a public forum, press releases, published or broadcast opinions, 
statements, and advertisements appearing in a broadcast media, or a newspa-
per, magazine or other bona fide publication disseminated on a regular basis. 
102 Georgeson, 2010 Annual Corporate Governance Review 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2010.pdf. 
103 See infra Subsection IV.B.4. 
104 In 2009, only 5 proxy statements or notices of exempt solicitations were filed in 
relation to withhold votes. See Georgeson, 2009 Annual Corporate Governance Re-
view 48–49 (2009), available at www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf. 
105 See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: 
Myth or Reality?, 59 Emory L.J. 869 (2010). 
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direct cause of withhold votes or whether an ISS withhold recom-
mendation and withhold votes have the same underlying cause. A 
recent paper co-authored by one of us estimates that the ISS rec-
ommendation independently shifts only 6%–10% of the share-
holder vote.106 Large withhold votes may thus come about either 
spontaneously or from low-level coordination among institutional 
investors through oral communications and aided by recommenda-
tions by proxy advisors. 
E. Who Will Use Proxy Access? 
Predicting at this point what type of shareholders would use the 
proxy access rule to make nominations and how frequently they 
would do so is somewhat speculative. However, at least a good ten-
tative sense of who would use proxy access can be obtained by 
looking at the activists who initiated full-fledged proxy contests 
and shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8. Each of these types 
of activism bears some similarity to proxy access: full-fledged (or 
traditional) proxy contests share with proxy access the feature that 
they concern the election of directors; Rule 14a-8 proposals share 
with proxy access the feature that they entail low costs unless the 
proponent engages in outside campaigning. 
Past participation in these forms of activism may be a predictor 
of future inclination to use proxy access for several reasons. First, 
proxy access may become a substitute for the other forms of activ-
ism: instead of, say, conducting a traditional proxy contest or mak-
ing a shareholder proposal, a shareholder may make a nomination 
using proxy access. Second, participation in these other forms of 
activism indicates an interest in being and willingness to be an ac-
tivist shareholder. Shareholders who, in the past, have remained 
passive when it came to voting are not likely to become active 
merely because—in addition to the existing avenues—a new way to 
become active presents itself. Relatedly, while proxy access repre-
sents a new, relatively cheap mode of activism, which may in prin-
ciple be attractive to highly cost-conscious investors, making a 
Rule 14a-8 proposal is an equally cheap, and widely available, 
 
106 Id. at 906. 
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mode of activism.107 Shareholders who have not made Rule 14a-8 
proposals are thus unlikely to make proxy access nominations 
merely because it involves low expenses. 
As discussed below,108 the third type of activism, withhold votes, 
also resembles proxy access. However, since the activists behind 
large withhold votes, to the extent any exist, are unknown, and 
since any such activists seem to prefer to stay out of the limelight, 
we cannot and probably should not look at large withhold votes to 
predict who would use proxy access. 
We start with proxy contests. As discussed, most (and most suc-
cessful) proxy contests are initiated by hedge funds and former in-
siders. None were initiated by pension funds or mutual funds.109 85% 
of the dissidents in these proxy contests had a stake of more than 
3% of the company when the contest commenced. However, under 
the rule adopted by the SEC, shareholders must also have held a 3% 
stake for the prior 3 years to qualify for proxy access. 
A 3-year holding period is a particular problem for hedge funds, 
given their intense focus on internal rates of return. If a hedge fund 
buys a $100 million stake and, within 1 year, changes things enough 
to increase the share price by 20%, it has a gross annual return of 
20%. If, to take advantage of the costs savings of proxy access, the 
hedge fund holds the position for 3 years, earns a “normal” return of 
5% in the first 3 years and then gets the same outcome with a 20% 
return in the fourth, the gross annual return goes from 20% per year 
to 8.6% per year. The cost savings would have to be huge to justify 
the much longer holding period, far higher than is reasonable to ex-
pect. Indeed, a spot check of 12 hedge funds that initiated proxy 
contests, based on 13F and other filings, showed that only 1 fund sat-
isfied the 3-year holding period. Former insiders, by contrast, were 
more likely to satisfy both the 3% threshold and the holding period. 
Turning next to shareholders who submitted Rule 14a-8 propos-
als, the largest institutional investors, who are most likely to satisfy a 
3% ownership threshold for proxy access, rarely made such submis-
 
107 As discussed below, a dissident shareholder has to make extensive disclosures to 
become eligible for proxy access and satisfy high minimum holding period and owner-
ship thresholds. See infra text accompanying notes 109–12 and 130–31. 
108 See infra Part IV. 
109 See supra Section II.B. 
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sions. Rather, most proposals were submitted by individual investors 
who hold trivial stakes in the respective companies.110 
Labor-affiliated groups, which also frequently sponsor share-
holder proposals, present a more mixed picture. Some labor groups 
that have been very active in submitting shareholder proposals have 
few investment assets. For example, the AFL-CIO sponsored 70 
resolutions through its $28 million “Reserve Fund.”111 In compari-
son, a 3% stake in the median S&P 600 SmallCap company would 
have a value of about $18 million. These smaller funds will thus gen-
erally hold stakes far below the threshold for proxy access.112 
The real union money is in joint union-employer pension funds 
subject to the Taft-Hartley Act (and thus known as “Taft-Hartley 
Plans” or “THPs”). THPs face two problems in utilizing proxy ac-
cess: collective action and fiduciary duties. 
There are approximately 1500 THPs113 that collectively manage 
approximately $400 billion in assets,114 of which approximately $100 
 
110 See supra note 98. Similarly, charities and social issue funds appear not to have as-
sets that are likely to be significant enough to qualify them for proxy access. For exam-
ple, the Unitarian Universalist Common Endowment Fund had an ending market value 
of $111.8 million as of June 30, 2010, and $21.8 million in domestic equity holdings. See 
Investment Performance Summary, Unitarian Universalist Common Endowment Fund 
(June 30, 2010), http://www.uua.org/documents/finance/uucef/100630_summary.pdf. 
111 See Georgeson, 2009 Annual Corporate Governance Review 15 (2009), available at 
www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf; see also AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO 
2009 Financial Report (2009), available at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/
convention/2009/upload/ec_finreport.pdf (stating $28 million of investments by the Re-
serve Fund at 2008 year end). 
112 In addition, a few of the social responsibility-oriented funds have assets of above $1 
billion. See Press Release, The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, The Children’s 
Investment Fund Foundation Files Accounts for 2008/9 (May 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.ciff.org/assets/financial/CIFF_Financial_Statement_27_May_2010.pdf (stat-
ing 2009 year-end assets of £1,445 million, equivalent to over $2 billion). 
113 Private Pensions: Long-standing Challenges Remain for Multiemployer Pensions 
Plans, Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 111th 
Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Charles Jeszeck, Acting Director, Education, Workforce, 
and Income Security Issues, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10708t.pdf (noting that there were approximately 1500 
multiemployer plans in 2009); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 2010 PBGC Annual Report 
2 (2010), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2010_annual_report.pdf (“[The 
PBGC] multiemployer program protects about 10.4 million works and retirees in about 
1,460 pension plans.”). 
114 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Pension Insurance Data Book 2009, at 105 (2010), 
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2009databook.pdf (reporting total assets of 
$434.9 billion at the beginning of 2007). 
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billion is in common stock.115 For comparison, TIAA-CREF alone 
controls approximately $420 billion. If all the assets of the activist 
$40 billion United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, which sponsored 203 Rule 14a-8 proposals, were spread 
proportionally over the S&P 1500 companies, the fund would only 
hold about 0.35% in each company. Accordingly, with the current, 
diversified asset allocation, THPs face a monstrous collective ac-
tion problem in satisfying the proxy access thresholds. 
Although, in principle, individual THPs or a small group could 
change their investment choices to build up stakes large enough to 
satisfy a 3 year/3% proxy access threshold, doing so would expose 
the plans and their fiduciaries to legal risk. THPs are subject to 
strict fiduciary standards under both the Taft-Hartley Act and 
ERISA, including ERISA § 404(a), which mandates that fiduciar-
ies must discharge their duties “solely in the interest of the partici-
pants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) 
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) 
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”116 In ad-
dition, fiduciaries must act “with the care, skill, prudence, and dili-
gence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in 
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like 
aims.”117 
In order to satisfy these mandates, many THPs hire outside 
money managers to manage their assets and delegate full authority 
to invest and vote. So long as this delegation is made prudently, 
THP trustees face minimal prospects of being sued. 
But suppose that, to satisfy the eligibility requirement for proxy 
access, a large and active THP chose to override the investment 
discretion of its outside money managers and invested an outsized 
portion of its pension assets in a specific company for 3 years. In 
making the investment decision, the plan fiduciaries, and anyone 
else exercising discretion, would take on the fiduciary duties out-
 
115 Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Private Pension Plan Bulletin: 
Abstract of 2008 Form 5500 Annual Reports 27 (2010), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008pensionplanbulletin.pdf (multiemployer pension 
plans with 100 or more participants had $107,637,000,000 in common stock in 2008). 
116 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006). 
117 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
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lined above,118 and in doing so, would incur significant legal risk. 
Indeed, the resulting firm-specific investment risk is significant 
enough that it is considered highly unlikely that any THPs will 
change their investment policies in order to qualify for proxy ac-
cess.119 So long as the THPs remain widely diversified, the collective 
action problems are sufficiently severe that they are unlikely to 
qualify for proxy access under a 3% eligibility threshold. 
By contrast, the few public funds that have sponsored more than 
a handful of shareholder proposals tend to be among the largest in-
stitutional investors. The New York City Pension Funds, CalPERS, 
and the New York State Retirement Fund—which, together, spon-
sored 70 proposals—have assets of $98 billion, $202 billion, and 
$134 billion, respectively.120 Of course, only a portion of these assets 
are invested in U.S. equities, and, of those, some are managed by 
external managers. Thus, for example, CalPERS claims to have 
voting authority only for about $30 billion of equities that are pub-
licly traded in the U.S.121 TIAA-CREF has $415 billion in assets 
 
118 Id. § 1002(21)(A) (“[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent 
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting man-
agement of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or 
disposition of its assets . . . .”). 
119 Personal communication with Damon A. Silvers, Director of Policy and Special 
Counsel, AFL-CIO (Jan. 27, 2011). 
120 See CalPERS, 2010 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 2 (2010) (valuing 
CalPERS at $201.6 billion as of June 30, 2010); Ciara Linnane, New York Comptrol-
ler Unveils Pension Fund Reform Plan, Reuters, Feb. 18, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61H3SD20100218 (valuing New York City’s 
pension fund at $98 billion); N.Y. State and Local Retirement System, 2010 Compre-
hensive Annual Financial Report 21 (2010) (valuing pension funds at $134.2 billion as 
of March 31, 2010). 
121 See CalPERS, Quarterly Report Filed by Institutional Managers (Form 13F-HR) 
(Jul. 22, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/919079/000114036110029935/
form13fhr.txt. On its website, CalPERS claims to have $119 billion invested in global 
equities (which includes U.S. and international equities as well as alternative invest-
ments and hedge funds), and that 40% of its U.S. equities are managed externally. 
See Facts at a Glance: Investments, CalPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/
about/facts/investments.pdf (last visited May 18, 2011); U.S. Equities, CalPERS (Nov. 
15, 2010), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/assets/equities/
usequities.xml. The discrepancy between these figures is likely due to the fact that 
outside money managers exercise voting authority over a portion of the CalPERS eq-
uity investments. The rule is not entirely clear as to whether shareholders like 
CalPERS can use all their shares in a company to meet the eligibility requirements 
even if some of these shares are managed by an outside money manager who has vot-
ing authority. The key is whether CalPERS has the “power” to vote the shares. If 
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under management122 and voting authority for over $92 billion of 
equities that are publicly traded in the U.S.123 Given their substan-
tial asset size, the larger public pension funds and especially TIAA-
CREF may well qualify for proxy access for several of their portfo-
lio companies outright. As large institutional investors, these enti-
ties are also relatively well positioned to assemble a group of 
shareholders that so qualifies. 
Of course, even these large institutional investors will not neces-
sarily own the requisite shares in the specific company for which 
they would want to use proxy access. Thus, for example, CalPERS 
held between 0.4% and 1.3% of the shares in the 6 S&P 1500 com-
panies to which it submitted a shareholder proposal in 2008.124 In 
 
CalPERS can at any time revoke the delegation of voting authority, one could argue 
that it either does have such authority already or that it could easily amend its con-
tracts prospectively to give it the power, when it chooses, to vote shares held on its 
behalf by outside money managers. The practicability of such contracts may depend 
on the type of outside money manager that CalPERS employs. To the extent that eq-
uity is held via mutual funds or hedge funds, rather than in managed accounts, it may 
be difficult for CalPERS to obtain the requisite voting power. 
 122 TIAA CREF, 2009 Annual Report 2 (2009), available at http://www.tiaa-
cref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp/documents/document/tiaa04018030.pdf. 
123 TIAA CREF Investment Management, LLC, Quarterly Report Filed By Institu-
tional Managers (Form 13F-HR) (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/887793/000088779310000005/r30-0630.txt. 
124  CalPERS owned 0.4% of Dollar Tree. See Dollar Tree, Definitive Additional 
Materials (Form DEFA 14A), at 2 (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/935703/000093570308000057/a.htm; California Public Employees 
Retirement System, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX 14A6G), at 1 (May 29, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/919079/000119380508
001433/e603890_px14a6g-dollar.htm. CalPERS owned 1.3% of Tech Data Corpora-
tion. See CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G), at 1 (May 15, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/790703/000118811
208001684/t62731_px14a6g.htm. CalPERS owned 0.7% of Interpublic Group. See In-
terpublic Group, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 2 (Apr. 18, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51644/000104746908004848/
a2184688zdef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX 14A6G), at 
1 (Apr. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51644/
000118811208001447/t62529_px14a6g.htm. CalPERS owned 0.4% of Hilb Rogal & 
Hobbs. See Hilb Rogal & Hobbs, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 1 
(Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814898/00011931
2508070921/ddef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX 
14A6G), at 1 (Apr. 23, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
814898/000091907908000007/hrh_filing.htm. CalPERS owned 0.5% of Standard Pa-
cific. See Standard Pacific Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 1 
(Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/878560/
000119312508072676/ddef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form 
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the 3 companies for which CalPERS made an exempt solicitation 
in support of a shareholder proposal in 2010, it held, respectively, 
0.2%, 0.4%, and 0.6% of the shares.125 TIAA-CREF held slightly 
above 1% of the shares in the two companies in which it made 
proposals in 2008.126 Presumably, the number of shares in these 
companies that has been held for the requisite 3-year period is 
even lower, perhaps substantially so. And the holdings of CalPERS 
are of a magnitude that suggests that even a group of several large 
public pension funds may not satisfy a 3% ownership threshold for 
a given company. Finally, both the large pension funds and, even 
more so, TIAA-CREF have been relatively restrained in offering 
shareholder resolutions under Rule 14a-8. In 2010, for example, 
TIAA-CREF did not make a single Rule14a-8 shareholder pro-
posal in an S&P 1500 company, even though it would have been 
qualified to do so for most if not all of the companies in the index. 
 
PX 14A6G), at 1 (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/878560/000117152008000224/eps2936.htm. CalPERS owned 0.4% of Eli Lilly & 
Co. See Eli Lilly & Co, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 3 (Mar. 10, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000095013
708003475/c22930ddef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX 
14A6G), at 1 (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
59478/000119380508000951/e603562_pxa146g-calpers.htm.  
125 CalPERS owned 0.2% of Health Net. See Health Net, Definitive Proxy State-
ment (Form DEF 14A), at 5 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/916085/000119312510088007/ddef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt 
Solicitation (Form PX14A6G), at 1 (May 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/916085/000117152010000282/eps3791.htm. CalPERS owned 
0.4% of Graco. See Graco, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 6 
(2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/42888/000095012
310023365/c56457ddef14a.htm; CalPERS (Form PX14A6G), at 1 (Mar. 30, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/42888/000117152010000236/
eps3761.htm. CalPERS owned 0.6% of Hospitality Properties Trust. See Hospitality 
Properties Trust, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 5 (2010), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/945394/000104746910001257/a2196573z
def14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G), at 1 (Mar. 
25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/919079/0001171
52010000222/eps3755.htm. 
126 See Johnson & Johnson, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 2, 58 
(Mar. 12, 2008), available at http://google.brand.edgar-online.com/DisplayFiling.aspx?
TabIndex=2&FilingID=5794786&companyid=10313&ppu=%252fdefault.aspx
%253fcompanyid%253d10313%2526amp%253bformtypeId%253d148 (Johnson & 
Johnson, 1%); PepsiCo, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 1, 49 (Mar. 
24, 2008), available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/pepsico-inc/def-14a-proxy-
statement-definitive/2008/03/24/section2.aspx (PepsiCo, 1.4%). 
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This, of course, raises substantial doubt about their proclivity to 
make proxy access nominations. Still, on occasion, these investors 
may both have an interest in becoming active in a company and ei-
ther meet the qualifications for proxy access for that company or 
be able to assemble a group of investors that does. 
In sum, judging from their past actions, the set of shareholders 
that have shown both an interest in activism and have some poten-
tial to be eligible for proxy access is fairly limited. Select public 
pension funds and, to a lesser extent, TIAA-CREF, have shown a 
modest interest in activism and may qualify for proxy access for 
some of their portfolio companies. Labor affiliated groups have 
shown a more significant interest in activism, but would be less 
likely to qualify due to the percentage ownership requirement. 
Hedge funds have been active in full-fledged contests, but would 
usually not satisfy a 3-year holding period. Former insiders may 
satisfy both the ownership threshold and the holding period re-
quirement for micro-cap companies (albeit generally not for larger 
companies).  
Of course, if the SEC releases a revised rule on proxy access in 
an effort to cure the deficiencies noted in the Court of Appeals, it 
may adopt different eligibility thresholds. We would anticipate that 
such thresholds would make eligibility more restrictive than the 
2010 rules. But even if the SEC decided to relax the eligibility 
standard and revert to the 1%/1-year standard applicable to larger 
accelerated filers under its 2009 proposal, the general thrust of our 
argument would remain: most large institutional investors have 
shown no interest in or inclination to types of activism similar to 
proxy access; and labor affiliated groups, which have shown them-
selves most interested in activism, would often fail to satisfy even a 
1% threshold.  
A remaining possibility is that some new player would emerge or 
an existing player would become a catalyst to organize the longer 
term shareholders such as mutual funds into a group large enough 
to meet the threshold for taking advantage of proxy access, similar 
to the way hedge funds have played a catalyst role in other areas of 
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corporate governance and corporate control.127 For reasons we dis-
cuss below,128 we think this is unlikely. 
Interest in activism and qualification for proxy access, of course, 
is just the beginning of the inquiry. The next steps are to determine 
whether it would make sense for these shareholders to pursue 
proxy access, as opposed to either a traditional proxy contest or a 
withhold campaign, and whether, if they were to pursue proxy ac-
cess, they would have a significant chance of succeeding. These is-
sues are taken up in the following Parts. 
III. PROXY ACCESS VERSUS TRADITIONAL PROXY CONTESTS 
In examining the impact of proxy access, one has to compare 
proxy access to the existing alternatives for shareholder activism to 
see what advantages it offers and what disadvantages it entails. The 
closest alternatives to proxy access are either the waging of a tradi-
tional proxy contest—in which a dissident submits its own proxy 
statement—or to withhold the vote for company nominees. In this 
Part, we will compare proxy access to a traditional proxy contest. 
In the next Part, we will compare it to withholding one’s vote. 
Before we commence our substantive discussion, we want to 
clarify the terminology we will be using. We will use the terms “dis-
sident” and “dissident shareholder” to refer to the party who initi-
ates (and pays for) a campaign and the terms “dissident nominee” 
and “company nominee” to refer to the persons running for seats 
on the board of directors nominated by the dissident or the board, 
respectively. We will use the terms “traditional proxy contest” and 
“proxy access contest” to distinguish between election contests in 
which the dissident, respectively, does not or does make use of 
proxy access. Finally, we will use the terms “withhold” or “just say 
no” campaign to refer to elections in which there is a large per-
centage of withhold votes, even if there is little or no observable 
campaigning. 
 
127 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1045 (2007). 
128 See infra Section IV.D. 
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A. Plusses of Proxy Access: Cost Savings 
The principal direct effect of proxy access is to reduce the costs 
of conducting a contested election. This is achieved by forcing 
companies to include, under certain circumstances, shareholder 
nominees in the company’s proxy statement. In this Section, we 
will discuss how significant these cost savings are. For purposes of 
this analysis, we will take as a starting point the costs of a tradi-
tional proxy contest and then analyze the extent to which these 
costs decline as a result of proxy access. As background, it is worth 
recalling the wide range of cost estimates for contested solicita-
tions, from about $30,000 to approximately $9 million.129 
1. Cost of Preparing a Proxy Statement That Complies with 
Schedule 14A 
Proxy access obviously has the result of removing the require-
ment for a dissident to prepare her own proxy statement. Instead, 
however, under the rule adopted by the SEC, a dissident would 
have to prepare and submit to the company a newly established 
Schedule 14N.130 But as we show, the net cost savings from having 
to prepare a Schedule 14N instead of a proxy statement are mini-
mal. 
The actual content of proxy statements can roughly be divided 
into 4 parts: required substantive information about the dissident 
and her nominees, certain technical information that identifies the 
issues and explains the basic ground rules, disclosures related to 
the company that duplicates the information provided by the com-
pany in its proxy statement, and additional information not re-
quired by the proxy rules. 
Table 4 below contains our analysis of Schedule 14A, which gov-
erns the required contents of proxy statements. As to each item or 
sub-item, we categorized the information required as substantive, 
technical, or unnecessarily duplicative. Items that do not relate to 
the election of directors, or only to uncontested elections, or that 
generally require disclosure only by the company, are omitted. 
 
129 See supra Table 1. 
130 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-1 (2010). We believe that any revised rule would contain 
equivalent requirements. Otherwise, shareholders would have less information about 
dissidents and their nominees in proxy access contests than in regular contests. 
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Table 4: Schedule 14A Items 
Item Description Category 14N 
1a, b Date, time, place of meeting; registrant’s address; 
mailing date 
Technical  





2 Proxy revocability Technical  
4b Solicitation methods, use of employees, contracts 
with other solicitation agents, total costs and costs 





5b Interest and security holdings of any participant; 
name, address, convictions, share transactions in 
prior 2 years, source of funds, contracts re securi-
ties; ownership, related transactions, future em-





6a–c Share info: outstanding, votes, record date, cumula-
tive voting 
Technical  
6d Ownership by management and 5% holders Duplica-
tive 
 
6e Information regarding change of control Duplica-
tive 
 
7b Only re nominees: bio, related transactions, 16(a)  Substan-
tive 
Yes 








21 Voting: required vote, abstentions and broker non-
votes 
Technical  
23 Documents where security holders share address Technical  
 
Substantive information includes biographical information about 
the nominees, information about other “participants” (for exam-
ple, the dissident entity) and their interest in the solicitation, and 
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information about solicitation methods and expenses. Unlike tech-
nical and duplicative information, substantive information must be 
prepared from scratch by the dissident. Moreover, the information 
that must be disclosed, in particular with respect to items 5 and 7, 
can be extensive. The preparation of substantive information, 
therefore, entails the greatest regulatory compliance costs. The 
proxy access rule would do nothing to reduce these costs, however, 
since a dissident and her nominees must provide the same substan-
tive information to the SEC and to the company on a newly cre-
ated Schedule 14N.131 
Technical information includes the name and address of the 
company, time and place of the annual meeting, information on 
how to vote, the record date, the effect of abstentions and broker 
no-votes, proxy revocability, the required vote, the number of 
shares outstanding, and some additional disclosure where one set 
of materials is sent to holders who share an address. Proxy access 
would save the costs associated with including this information in a 
proxy statement. But because technical information is of limited 
scope and basically copied from the company’s proxy statement, 
these cost savings would be trivial. 
Duplicative information includes information about sharehold-
ings by 5% owners and by management, information about any is-
sue for which the dissident does not engage in a counter-
solicitation, as well as information as to whether a change of con-
trol has occurred and by what deadline shareholder proposals must 
be submitted for the annual meeting in the following year. Since all 
of this information is already included in the company’s proxy 
statement, and as long as dissidents do not have private informa-
tion indicating that the information provided by the company is in-
correct, it is not clear why the SEC requires the disclosure of this 
duplicative information.132 But since duplicative information can be 
 
131 Id. § 240.14n-101. 
132 As to agenda items other than the election of directors, as long as dissidents make 
no recommendation about how to vote or the same recommendation as the company, 
they also should be permitted to refer to the company’s proxy statement for further 
information on these items. To be sure, this would mean that shareholders have to 
access the company’s proxy statement to get such information. But the same is true 
whenever a company uses notice and access, where shareholders are given a voting 
form and told where they can get additional information on the item at issue. As to 
the other items, the SEC should not require their disclosure in dissident proxy state-
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copied from the company’s proxy statement, the regulatory com-
pliance burden is minimal. 
A significant portion of the proxy statement is taken up by in-
formation that is not required by SEC rules.133 Such information is 
usually intended to influence shareholder votes. As such, it resem-
bles other campaign expenses. Campaign information included in a 
proxy statement often consists of additional information about the 
dissident and her nominees,134 the reasons for the solicitations,135 
and any business strategies that the dissident would want the com-
pany to explore;136 the address of the proxy solicitor who can pro-
vide further information and assistance in voting;137 and several 
boldfaced recommendations on how to vote.138 Obviously, since 
these information items are provided voluntarily and serve a cam-
paigning rather than a regulatory compliance function, proxy ac-
cess does not result in any cost savings as to these items. 
In sum then, the proxy access rule only reduces the costs associ-
ated with the preparation of a proxy statement that satisfies the 
regulatory requirements by eliminating the costs associated with 
the preparation of duplicative and technical information. As to 
substantive and campaign information, the dissident must either 
prepare a statement containing the same information even under 
proxy access or it does not have to provide the information to start 
with. The technical and duplicative information spans only a few 
pages and is copied from the company’s proxy statement. The re-
sulting cost savings will therefore be minimal. 
 
ments (as it did, for example, for information in Item 8 of Regulation 14A) unless the 
dissident has access to information not available to the company which indicates that 
the information in the company’s proxy statement is incorrect. 
133 See, e.g., Metropolitan Capital Advisors, Definitive Proxy Statement Filed by 
Non-Registrant (Form DEFN 14A), at 3–10 (Jan. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Metropolitan 
Proxy Statement], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864683/
000119312507001082/ddefn14a.htm. 
134 See id. at 10–11. 
135 See id. at 4–10. 
136 See Trian Fund Management, Definitive Additional Proxy Materials Filed by 
Non-Registrant (Form DFAN 14A) (May 23, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/46640/000095011706002372/ex1.htm (showing dissident Trian 
Group offering new business strategies for H.J. Heinz Company). 
137 See Metropolitan Proxy Statement, supra note 133, at 3. 
138 See id. at 3, 12. 
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2. Cost of Distributing the Proxy Statement to All Solicited 
Shareholders 
Proxy access also eliminates the requirement for dissidents to 
distribute the proxy statement to all solicited shareholders. As a re-
sult, nominations under proxy access will save the costs of printing, 
mailing and distributing the proxy statement. 
Printing and mailing expenses for a proxy statement depend on 
the length of the statement and the number of shareholders that 
are being solicited. A dissident proxy statement that contains only 
the required disclosures would typically be 10–15 pages long. 
Printing and mailing expenses are further reduced in two ways. 
First, many shareholders do not receive printed proxy statements, 
either because they have signed up for internet delivery, because 
they participate in ProxyEdge (an electronic delivery system for in-
stitutional shareholders set up by Broadridge), or because a single 
statement is sent to a financial advisor for a managed account or to 
a household with multiple shareholders. In uncontested 2010 elec-
tions, these “suppressed” accounts total about 54% of all distrib-
uted proxy statements, and their percentage has been rising.139 As 
to suppressed mailings, dissidents have no printing and mailing ex-
penses, and instead just pay an incentive fee of 25 or 50 cents per 
account, depending on the size of the distribution.140 
Second, the proxy rules do not require a dissident to provide a 
proxy statement to each shareholder. A dissident could, if it opted 
to do so, forego soliciting small shareholders and not send them a 
proxy statement either.141 Data compiled by Broadridge suggest 
 
139 See Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., 2010 Proxy Season: Key Statistics & 
Performance Ratings 2 (2010) [hereinafter Key Statistics], available at 
http://www.broadridge.com/investor-communications/us/Broadridge_Proxy_
Stats_2010.pdf (54.4% suppression in 2010); Compass Lexecon, An Analysis of Bene-
ficial Proxy Delivery Services 14 (May 11, 2010) [hereinafter Beneficial Proxy Deliv-
ery Services], available at http://www.broadridgeinfo.com/ADPFiles/Compass%
20Lexecon%20Report%20Final%2005-14-10.pdf (showing steadily increasing sup-
pression percentages from 7.7% in 1998 to 53.2% in 2009). 
140 NYSE Rule 465, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2465 (June 2010). 
141 The recently enacted rules on internet availability of proxy materials offer dissi-
dents another option. Under these rules, a dissident does not have to mail paper 
proxy statements to shareholders as long as they provide shareholders with a short 
(typically half-page) notice at least 10 days before a proxy form or other solicitation 
materials are sent to shareholders regarding the internet availability of the informa-
tion, post the proxy statement on a website, and supply paper and email copies on re-
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that accounts containing fewer than 1000 shares constitute about 
90% of all accounts, but that the shares in these accounts constitute 
only 3.7% of the votes cast.142 Moreover, over half of the shares 
voted that are held in such small accounts are voted through 
ProxyEdge, an electronic system established by Broadridge for in-
stitutional investors and investment advisors that permits the vot-
ing of shares held in different accounts on a consolidated basis.143 
ProxyEdge enables an investor or advisor to vote shares held in all 
accounts, whether or not the holder received a proxy statement for 
any particular account, at least as long as that holder also has 
shares in a different account for which it received a proxy state-
ment. As a result, printing and mailing expenses can be dramati-
cally reduced, with a minimal impact on the voting outcome, by not 
mailing proxy statements to holders of small accounts. 
In addition to printing and mailing expenses, any person who 
distributes a proxy statement (or another mailing) to beneficial 
owners has to pay a unit fee to the securities intermediary through 
which the shares are held. In a contested election, this fee is $1 for 
the mailing of the proxy statement.144 The unit fee is payable for ac-
counts that receive hard copies of the proxy statement as well as 
for suppressed accounts, but is not payable for accounts that are 
excluded from a distribution (for example, because the number of 
shares held in the account is too small). 
 
quest. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2010). Typically, less than 5% of the shareholders re-
quest paper copies. Personal communication with Charles V. Callan, Chief Regula-
tory Officer, Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Oct. 25, 2010). Thus, notice and 
access reduce the costs for printing and mailing the proxy statement. Notice and ac-
cess, however, require the dissident to make one mailing (of the notice) without any 
campaign literature and impose a 10-day delay for the distribution of campaign mate-
rials. For that reason, most dissidents do not avail themselves of notice and access. 
142 See Key Statistics, supra note 139, at 3 (providing 3.7% of votes cast figure). That 
such small accounts constitute about 90% of all accounts is our estimate derived from 
the data on ballot share amounts and total shares processed in the Key Statistics and 
estimates of the total number of accounts derived from these statistics. 
143 Id. 
144 NYSE Rule 465, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2465 (June 2010). It is somewhat 
ironic that the largest expense component obviated by proxy access is a fee imposed 
by New York Stock Exchange Rules and sanctioned by the SEC. Much of the effect 
of proxy access thus could have been achieved by merely lowering this fee. 
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3. Costs of Collecting and Processing Votes 
A third saving associated with proxy access relates to the costs of 
mailing separate proxy forms to shareholders and the costs of re-
turn postage and of processing the returned forms. In a traditional 
proxy contest, both the company and a dissident prepare their own 
proxy forms and forms of voting instructions. Proxy forms are sent 
to shareholders who are also listed as record holders in the com-
pany’s register. These proxy forms are then typically returned to, 
respectively, the company’s or the dissident’s proxy solicitor. For 
shareholders who hold their shares through brokers and banks, 
Broadridge distributes voting instruction forms which are then re-
turned to Broadridge, tabulated, and presented to the company’s 
vote tabulator.145 Under proxy access, however, there is only one 
form of proxy and one form of voting instructions that contains 
both the company’s and the dissident’s nominees. These forms are 
distributed to shareholders at the company’s expense and, if 
mailed, returned at the company’s expense. The dissident pays 
nothing. 
In traditional proxy contests, the proxy statement and the voting 
forms are mailed out together. Compared to traditional contests, 
proxy access thus generates savings for the printing costs of voting 
forms and the costs associated with the return of the voting forms. 
In traditional contests, the latter costs obviously arise only (and the 
cost savings generated by proxy access thus extend only) with re-
spect to the portion of the dissident’s forms that are used to cast 
votes for the dissident. 
4. Campaign Expenses, Including Associated Legal and 
Regulatory Expenses 
Campaign expenses are, in most contests, by far the largest ex-
pense item. They include all campaign materials and information 
provided to shareholders that go beyond the required disclosures 
made in the proxy statement. While the proxy statement serves 
also as a regulatory compliance document with a lot of fine print, 
the other mailings to shareholders (so-called “fight letters”) tend to 
be more catchy and reader friendly and to focus on the issues and 
 
145 Shareholders are also given the option to vote by phone or via the internet. 
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information likely to influence shareholders, rather than on disclo-
sures required by the SEC.146 In addition to drafting and sending 
fight letters, solicitors make personal phone calls to record holders, 
beneficial holders who have not objected to the disclosure of their 
names (so-called NOBOs), and other institutions who are known 
(as a result of their public filings or industry rumors) to hold shares 
in the company. For larger holders and proxy advisors, dissidents 
sometimes make detailed presentations of their future strategic 
plans for the company and the benefits they expect to reap. Other 
campaign expenses include the cost of strategic advice provided by 
proxy solicitors, the cost of legal advice related to campaign mate-
rials (for example, review of these materials for compliance with 
the anti-fraud rules), and litigation expenses concerning these ma-
terials. Proxy access has virtually no impact on these cost items and 
any associated legal and regulatory expenses. Even under proxy 
access, to the extent that a dissident engages in any such campaign-
ing, all these expenses must still be borne by the dissident. 
The only exception is that the dissident may include a supporting 
statement of up to 500 words in the company’s proxy statement.147 
While the dissident bears the cost of preparing that statement, the 
costs of distributing it fall on the company. For a dissident who 
does not otherwise campaign, the supporting statement is the only 
campaign material that is provided to shareholders and the dissi-
dent is limited to the 500-word statement in explaining why share-
holders should vote for the dissident nominee instead of a com-
pany nominee. 
We doubt, however, that this supporting statement will be effec-
tive. First, a 500-word statement is very short to make both the 
negative case that the management nominees should not all be re-
elected and the affirmative case that the dissident nominee de-
serves election instead. While a 500-word statement in support of a 
shareholder proposal can be enough to identify a proposal as one 
of a standard type (for example, to declassify the board), director 
elections are a much more complex decision. Second, many share-
 
146 See, e.g., The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders, Defini-
tive Additional Proxy Materials Filed by Non-Registrant (Form DFAN 14A) (Jan. 12, 
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864683/00011931250700
5900/ddfan14a.htm. 
147 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(c) (2010). 
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holders may never read the dissident’s supporting statement. Com-
pany proxy statements are significantly longer than dissident proxy 
statements because of additional disclosure requirements imposed 
only on the company.148 The company can thus easily bury the sup-
porting statement somewhere in the long compliance document 
where it is unlikely to be noticed even by shareholders who receive 
a paper copy. Moreover, the company can use “notice and access” 
for distributing its proxy statement.149 Under notice and access, the 
company mails a short notice to shareholders informing them how 
to receive a paper or electronic copy of the proxy statement.150 
Shareholders who do nothing thus never receive a copy of the 
proxy statement. But, while the proxy statement itself is mailed out 
only on request, the company can distribute its own fight letters, 
which will not contain the dissident’s supporting statement, to all 
shareholders. For dissidents who do not otherwise campaign, this 
means that many shareholders will never read the supporting 
statement, though they may receive plenty of campaign materials 
from the company. 
5. Assessment of Aggregate Cost Savings 
Data on distribution size, total solicitation costs, and printing 
and postage expenses compiled by the former parent company of 
Broadridge for proxy contests from 2003 to 2005 enable us to 
evaluate the aggregate cost savings that would have been gener-
ated in these contests if the dissident had used proxy access.151 We 
 
148 See, e.g., Id. § 240.14a-101, Items 8 and 9. 
149 Id. § 240.14a-16; Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet Availability of Proxy 
Materials, Securities Act Release No. 9108, Exchange Act Release No. 61,560, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 29,131, 75 Fed. Reg. 9073 (Feb. 26, 2010), re-
printed in [2009-2010 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,866, at 84,708 
(Feb. 22, 2010); Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 56,135, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,911, 72 Fed. Reg. 422,221 
(Aug. 1, 2007). 
150 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2010); Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, 
Exchange Act Release No. 56,135, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,911, 72 
Fed. Reg. 422,221 (Aug. 1, 2007). In addition, the Commission has adopted the no-
tice-and-access model that permits issuers to send shareholders a Notice of Internet 
Availability of Proxy Materials in lieu of the traditional paper packages. 
151 These data are contained in a letter from Richard J. Daly, Group Co-President, 
Automatic Data Processing, Inc., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
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used these data as input to a regression to estimate both the total 
solicitation expenses and the printing and postage expenses associ-
ated with the mailing of the proxy statement as a function of the 
size of the initial distribution and of any subsequent fight letters,152 
and calculated total cost savings as the sum of the saved printing 
and mailing costs, the $1 unit fee per account, and an additional es-
timate of $0.50 per account for the costs associated with the print-
ing and collection of voting forms and other expenses. Reflecting 
the fact that many companies involved in proxy contests are small 
and that dissidents decide not to mail statements to shareholders 
who hold few shares, the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percen-
tile of the actual distribution sizes were, respectively, about 1,600; 
2,500; and 5,600. The largest distribution was made to 203,000 
shareholders and the second largest to 32,000. 
In dollar terms, the estimated cost savings for the 25th percen-
tile, median, and 75th percentile distributions amounted to $7,000; 
$9,800; and $17,700, respectively.153 Even for significantly larger dis-
tribution sizes of 20,000 and 50,000, the estimated cost savings are 
modest, $47,000 and $100,000, respectively. In percentage terms, 
the cost savings for the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile 
distributions account for 3.4%, 4.3%, and 5.8%, respectively, of so-
licitation expense estimates provided by dissidents in their proxy 
statements. For distributions above 10,000, percentage cost savings 
stabilize at around 6.6%. 
 
Comm’n (Apr. 20, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71005/
ccallan1565.pdf. 
152 We removed one outlier in running this regression. 
153 These cost measures are not adjusted for inflation. Nevertheless, we believe that 
they reflect an overestimate of actual cost savings for several reasons. First, the per-
centage of suppressed accounts that do not receive hard copies of the proxy statement 
increased from 32.4% to 40.9% in the years 2003–2005 to 54.4% for 2010. See Key 
Statistics, supra note 139, at 1; Beneficial Proxy Delivery Services, supra note 139, at 
14. Second, we believe that our allowance of $0.50 for the costs associated with voting 
is conservative, especially for larger contests and in light of the fact that only 82% of 
the shares are voted through ProxyEdge and 10% through the internet. See Key Sta-
tistics, supra note 139, at 3. Third, the Broadridge estimate concerned the cost of 
printing and mailing the actual proxy statements used by the dissident, rather than a 
minimal statement containing only the required disclosures and a 500-word support-
ing statement. Fourth, one large cost item, the unit fee payable to intermediaries, is 
based on 2010 cost levels. Note that the issuer’s printing and mailing expenses are 
substantially higher since issuers often mail glossy (both expensive to print and to 
mail) annual reports to shareholders with their proxy statements. 
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B. Minuses of Proxy Access 
1. Limitations on Nominees 
In traditional contests, dissidents can make as many nominations 
as there are board seats up for election. For companies without a 
staggered board, this means that they can run nominees for the en-
tire board and take over control in one proxy contest. In compa-
nies with staggered boards, this typically means that they can run 
nominees for the one-third of the board up for election each year. 
Under proxy access, the number of nominees would be more 
confined. Only one shareholder dissident may use proxy access for 
any given election, and that shareholder may nominate directors 
for no more than 25% of the board seats.154 Thus, for example, if 
the board has 7 members, the dissident may nominate one candi-
date; if the board has 12 members, the dissident may nominate up 
to 3 candidates. Any previously elected dissident candidates who 
remain on the board count towards that maximum.155 
The limitations imposed by the proxy access rule would clearly 
be problematic for any dissident who, but for these limitations, 
would have wanted to nominate candidates for more than 25% of 
the board seats. Such a dissident may therefore prefer to run a tra-
ditional contest instead of a proxy access contest. 
In our sample of contested elections, dissidents in 59% of the 
contests involving former insiders sought board control156 and, in 
another 29% sought more than the 25% of the seats obtainable via 
proxy access. Particularly for former insiders, proxy access would 
probably not be a useful alternative to a full-fledged proxy contest. 
But many dissidents run so-called “short slate” contests. In short 
slate contests, the dissident nominates fewer candidates than there 
are seats up for election and fills the remaining spots with company 
nominees. By definition, in short slate contests, a dissident does not 
nominate the maximum number of candidates possible. Short slate 
 
154 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(d) (2010). 
155 Id. § 240.14a-11(d)(2). 
156 We characterized dissidents as seeking board control if they contested more than 
a majority of the board seats. Hedge funds sought control in only 17% of the contests. 
For companies with staggered boards, even a dissident who contests all the board 
seats up for election will usually contest less than a majority of the seats. If such con-
tests are redefined as control contests, the percentage of former insiders seeking con-
trol rises to 76%. 
KAHANROCK_BOOK 9/15/20117:46 PM 
2011] Insignificance of Proxy Access 1395 
contests are often run by hedge funds that seek board representa-
tion but, intentionally, do not seek board control. Even though 
short slate contests sometimes involve more than 25% of the seats, 
the limitation on the number of candidates would seem to be less 
severe for short slate contests than for other contests. 
However, even for short slate contests, and even for the subset 
of short slate contests involving no more than 25% of the seats, the 
limitation on nominees is significant. While a dissident in a short 
slate contest does not seek immediate control, the power of any 
elected dissident nominees depends on the future threat of a con-
trol contest. As discussed below,157 minority representation on the 
board not coupled with such a threat may not amount to much. 
The minority can always be outvoted and even shut-out completely 
from the decision-making process by the delegation of decision-
making power to board committees on which the minority is not 
represented. The power of a minority board member depends on 
her ability to persuade other directors and on the ability of the dis-
sident to take over control if the majority is recalcitrant. 
In a typical short slate contest in which dissident nominees are 
elected, the dissident has shown her ability to mount a successful 
contest and the shareholders have indicated that they want the dis-
sident nominees’ views to be taken into account. A majority that 
ignores the dissident acts at its peril. 
In a proxy access contest, the situation is less stark. To be sure, 
the shareholders have shown support for the dissident. But the dis-
sident cannot obtain board control via proxy access. The dissident 
may try to gain control through a traditional proxy contest in the 
year following the proxy access contest. But the threat of doing so 
would be undermined by the requirement in the proxy access rule 
that a dissident not have the purpose of changing control or gaining 
more board seats than the 25% threshold available via proxy ac-
cess.158 A dissident who, at the time of a proxy access nomination, 
claimed not to seek control and made nominations for less than 
25% of the board and then, a year later, changed her tune arguing 
that her intentions had changed because the board majority ig-
 
157 See infra Section IV.A. 
158 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(6) (2010). 
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nored the dissident nominees’ views would run significant litigation 
risk. 
Even if this obstacle is overcome, the mere fact that a dissident 
used proxy access would make the threat of running a traditional 
proxy contest in the following year less credible. By using proxy 
access, a dissident signals that she is highly cost-conscious and will-
ing, as we will show below,159 to accept a significantly lower chance 
of winning in exchange for a small reduction in proxy contest ex-
penditures. This is not a message of shock and awe and is much less 
likely than a successful short slate contest to induce cooperation by 
the majority. 
2. Higher Voting Threshold 
The practical effect of proxy access, and the way it is likely to be 
implemented, will raise the level of shareholder support that is re-
quired for dissident nominees to succeed. To see this effect, we 
have to delve deeper into the board election system and the design 
of voting forms. In contested board elections, the candidates with 
the most votes fill the available seats. Moreover, shareholders 
normally can vote for as many candidates as there are seats to be 
filled.160 
In traditional contests, it generally takes the support of a major-
ity of the shares that are voted to get a dissident nominee elected. 
In these contests, both sides—the company and the dissident—
distribute separate voting forms listing the respective sides’ nomi-
nees. In traditional short slate contests, the dissident completes the 
slate by listing specific company nominees in addition to the dissi-
dent nominees.161 While a shareholder may decide not to vote for 
all of the dissident’s or for all of the company’s nominees listed on 
the respective form, it is very difficult for a shareholder to vote for 
some of the dissident’s nominees and some of the company’s 
nominees not listed on the dissident form.162 Given this design of 
 
159 See infra Subsections III.B.2–6. 
160 We focus here on elections without cumulative voting. Cumulative voting is ad-
dressed infra Subsection III.B.5. 
161 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(4) (2010). 
162 To do that, the shareholder would have to show up in person at the meeting and, 
if the shareholder were not a record holder, would in addition have to get a proxy 
from the record holder before the meeting. 
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the voting forms, most shareholders vote either for all the company 
nominees or for all the dissident nominees (including, in a short 
slate contest, the company nominees listed on the dissident’s proxy 
form). Some shareholders vote for a subset of the respective nomi-
nees. But, we believe, it is extremely rare for shareholders to split 
their votes. In this structure, if holders of a majority of voted 
shares—and occasionally even fewer—support a dissident nomi-
nee, the nominee will get elected. 
By contrast, under proxy access, it may take substantially more 
votes to be elected. The reason is that both the dissident and the 
company nominees appear on a single ballot form. Consider a hy-
pothetical election with 7 candidates for 5 seats to the board of a 
company with 1 million voting shares. The table below gives the 
votes received by each nominee. Even though Fred received the 
votes of holders of 69% of the voting shares, he is not elected. 
 
Nominee Votes 
Alice  790,000 
Bill  770,000 
Claire  750,000 
David  730,000 
Emily  710,000 
Fred  690,000 
Gillian  560,000 
 Total 5,000,000 
 
 The difference in required votes between traditional contests 
and proxy access contests is due to the fact that, in traditional con-
tests, shareholders cannot split their votes between dissident nomi-
nees and those company nominees that do not appear on the dissi-
dent ballot. In traditional short slate contests, the company 
nominee who is also named on the dissident ballot is virtually as-
sured election. From the dissident’s perspective, votes for this 
company nominee are harmless. The dissident only cares about the 
votes received by its nominees and by the company nominees who 
do not appear on the dissident’s ballot, and the ballot design as-
sures that supporters of the dissident do not vote for those nomi-
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nees. In effect, the ballot design enables the dissident to coordinate 
the votes by its supporters and to assure that they do not cast any 
votes for the “wrong” company nominee. Under proxy access, a 
single voting form does not afford such coordination. Shareholders 
can vote for a dissident nominee and any company nominee and 
may not even know which company nominee the dissident is trying 
to defeat.163 The likely result is that many shareholders who vote 
for dissident nominees will spread their remaining votes among dif-
ferent company nominees. 
To see the effect of this feature of proxy access on the required 
vote, take the extreme case in which all shareholders vote for the 
maximum permissible number of nominees and in which share-
holders who support the dissident vote for all dissident nominees 
and distribute their remaining votes evenly among the company 
nominees. Let S be the number of board seats up for election and 
V be the number of dissident nominees. To get elected, a dissident 
nominee must receive a fraction of votes d > S/(S+V). The reason 
is that each company nominee will get the vote of the fraction (1-d) 
of the shares that did not support the dissident, and, in addition, a 
fraction equal to d*(S-V)/S from supporters of the dissident who 
distribute their remaining votes (S-V) evenly among the S company 
nominees. 
If a dissident makes nominations for all open seats (if V=S), it 
just takes the support of more than half of the voting shares to get 
the dissident nominees election. However, as the proxy access rule 
limits the number of nominees to 25% of the board, most proxy ac-
cess contests would be for less than all of the open seats. If the 
whole board is up for election, V would be at most (S/4), and the 
support required to get elected would be 80% of the voting shares 
(or more if the number of open board seats is not divisible by 4). 
For companies with a staggered board and classes of equal size, V 
would be at most (3S/4), and the support required to get elected 
would be 57% (or more if the number of open board seats is not 
 
163 The 500-word limit on the supporting statement and the fact that it may not be 
read by all shareholders make it a rather ineffective vehicle for effecting such coordi-
nation. To be sure, to the extent that a dissident engages in additional campaigning, it 
can ask shareholders not to vote for specific (or any) company nominees. But the fact 
that such targeting is not automatically induced by the design of the voting forms is 
likely to make it much less effective. 
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divisible by 4). Most such staggered boards have 9 members, in 
which case the required support threshold would be 60%. 
Admittedly, the assumptions we used to make these calculations 
represent an extreme case. Some dissident supporters may cast 
votes only in favor of the dissident nominees, even though they 
have additional votes they are permitted to cast. To the extent that 
dissident supporters also cast votes for board nominees, they may 
not do so evenly but rather based on factors such as the description 
of the board nominee in the proxy statement, the order in which 
the nominees are listed, or voting recommendations received by a 
proxy advisor. Thus, in reality, the effect of the ballot design under 
proxy access will be less strong than as presented in our calcula-
tions. 
3. Design of the Proxy Card 
Under proxy access, the single ballot forms sent to shareholders 
are prepared by the company. This, by itself, entails significant ad-
vantages for the company and disadvantages for the dissident. 
First, the adopting release for the proxy access rule makes clear 
that the company is permitted to note on these forms that it rec-
ommends that shareholders vote for its nominees and against the 
dissident’s nominees.164 
Second, if the proxy form is signed but no specific instructions 
are marked, the shares to which the proxy relates can be voted for 
the company’s nominees.165 
Third, when dissidents mail fight letters or other campaign mate-
rials to shareholders, they will not be able to include a ballot form 
with their materials. Inclusion of a proxy or voting instruction form 
would result in the dissident losing the exemption under Rule 14a-
 
164 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,723–24 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
165 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c) (2010); see also Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,724 n.609 (Sept. 
16, 2010) (“We anticipate that companies would continue to be able to solicit discre-
tionary authority to vote a shareholder’s shares for the company nominees . . . .”). 
Rule 14a-4(c) as amended prohibits proxy “slate voting” (on the grounds that it would 
unduly favor management) but anticipates the continuation of discretionary voting by 
management when authorized by shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c) (2010). 
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2(b)(1) that would otherwise apply to the fight letters and would 
thus require the dissident to furnish its own proxy statement to all 
solicited holders.166 Moreover, even if the SEC expands the exemp-
tion under Rule 14a-2(b)(1) to include solicitations where a dissi-
dent distributes only the company’s proxy and voting instruction 
form, inclusion of such forms is not practical for beneficial holders. 
Voting instructions supplied to beneficial holders are not generic 
but carry unique, holder-specific control numbers.167 The holder-
specific numbers on the company’s voting instruction form would 
ordinarily not be available to the dissident, and a shareholder who 
returns a form with the incorrect control number would not validly 
vote her shares. 
Campaign materials not accompanied by a proxy or voting in-
struction form are less effective. Any shareholder who, after read-
ing the materials, decides to vote for the dissident has to search for 
the ballot form sent to her by the company or, if that form has been 
lost or has already been mailed back, has to request a new form. If 
the shareholder neglects to do so, or changes her mind in the in-
terim, the vote for the dissident is lost. 
Finally, the design of the proxy card may result in a dispropor-
tionately large number of invalid votes from shareholders who 
support the dissident nominees. In a director election, the maxi-
mum number of votes is equal to the number of available board 
seats. As explained above, in a traditional proxy contest both the 
company’s and the dissident’s forms are designed to assure that 
shareholders do not overvote. In proxy access contests, however, a 
shareholder may mark “for” for more nominees than there are 
seats to fill. By definition, a shareholder who overvotes must have 
voted for at least some dissident nominees. Moreover, most of 
them presumably did so conscious of the fact that the company rec-
ommended a vote “against” all the dissident nominees. Dissidents 
will thus effectively lose the support from these shareholders. 
 
166 That rule exempts from the requirement to furnish a proxy statement certain so-
licitations where the person making the solicitation does not “seek . . . the power to 
act as proxy . . . and does not furnish . . . a form of revocation, abstention, consent or 
authorization.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (2010). 
167 Personal communication with Charles V. Callan, Chief Regulatory Officer, 
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Oct. 25, 2010). 
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4. Fighting in the Dark 
When shareholders submit their votes, they do not go into a 
black ballot box that is left unopened until the shareholder meet-
ing, when the votes are counted and the winner is declared. Rather, 
information about who casts votes for whom becomes available 
throughout the duration of the contest. 
In traditional contests, shareholders who hold their shares di-
rectly on the company’s books (“registered holders”) receive proxy 
forms directly from the company and from a dissident and return 
the proxy they execute to the company or the dissident, as the case 
may be. As to these proxies, each side will know who returned the 
proxy form to it and how they voted, but neither side will know—
except by inference—who returned the proxy form to the other 
side and how they voted. That is, the company, for example, will 
see the proxies it receives, which will appoint some member of 
management as proxy and, for the most part, authorize that person 
to vote the shares as recommended by the company.168 From the 
fact that certain proxies have not been returned, the company can 
deduce that these shares have either not been voted yet or that 
proxies were given to dissidents. Dissidents are in an analogous po-
sition. 
Shareholders who hold shares through brokerage or bank ac-
counts (“beneficial holders”)—a category that includes holders of 
most of the outstanding shares—receive voting instruction forms 
mailed to them by Broadridge on behalf of the company and the 
dissident, with both sides using different forms, and return one of 
the forms to Broadridge. In traditional contests, Broadridge pro-
vides both sides with daily vote tallies and weekly reports showing, 
for each broker, how many shares have been voted and for whom 
they have voted.169 We will refer to this information provided by 
Broadridge, together with the information obtained from directly 
returned proxies, as “preliminary voting information.” 
 
168 In traditional contests, a shareholder may withhold authority to vote the shares in 
a certain way but cannot require the proxy to vote the shares for a director nominee 
not recommended by management. 
169 Personal communication with Charles V. Callan, Chief Regulatory Officer, 
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Oct. 25, 2010).  
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Access to preliminary voting information is very important. 
Proxy solicitors and their clients use it for several purposes.170 First, 
most generally, they use it to determine whether their overall strat-
egy is successful. If the results are close, the client may decide to 
expend additional resources. If results indicate that the outcome is 
clear, management or dissidents may decide to settle or fold rather 
than spend more money on a hopeless campaign. Second, solicitors 
can use the information to figure out whether major institutional 
holders have voted their shares and how they voted. Even though 
these holders usually hold their shares through banks or broker-
ages and no direct information on their voting is provided, solici-
tors have some general ideas about how many shares an institution 
holds and which intermediary it uses. Thus, changes in the vote tal-
lies provide a good indication of how certain institutions are voting. 
Solicitors can accordingly engage in more effective solicitations of 
these institutions. Third, solicitors can estimate how retail share-
holders are voting and adjust their campaign message to this group 
of holders. Fourth, as to registered holders, solicitors can engage in 
targeted campaigns for holders who have not returned their proxy 
forms. Finally, proxy solicitors can police for mistakes. As we have 
discussed in an earlier article, the proxy voting system is prone to 
administrative and clerical errors that can easily—and, under ap-
plicable law, irreversibly—affect the ultimate outcome of close 
contests.171 And, as discussed above,172 mistakes involving overvot-
ing may easily occur in proxy access contests. 
In traditional contests, access to preliminary voting information 
is roughly symmetrical: Broadridge provides the same information 
to both sides, and, as to proxies directly returned by registered 
holders, each side sees the proxies it gets but not those the other 
 
170 Personal communication with Alan Miller, Co-chairman, Innisfree M&A, Inc. 
(June 4, 2010).  
171 See Kahan & Rock, Hanging Chads, supra note 68, at 1249–55, 1267–70. A re-
cent, if extreme, example of such a mistake occurred in a proxy contest waged by 
Terra Industries on the board election for CF Industries Holdings. The night before 
the vote, a proxy solicitor noted that a vote by a large institutional holder who had 
indicated support for its client had not been tallied. After inquiries, the solicitor de-
termined that RiskMetrics, who had been hired by the institutional holder to deal 
with the mechanics of voting, had mistakenly failed to vote the shares. RiskMetrics 
was alerted to the mistake and managed to cast the vote before the ballot closed. 
172 See supra Subsection III.B.3. 
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side gets. In proxy access contests, by contrast, information is likely 
to be completely one-sided. As to proxies sent directly to regis-
tered holders, shareholders can vote either for the company’s or 
for the dissident’s nominees, but either way these proxies are re-
turned to, and seen only by, the company. The dissident sees noth-
ing. As to beneficial holders, Broadridge generally provides pre-
liminary voting information only to clients who mail out their own 
proxy forms. Dissidents who make no mailing to shareholders re-
ceive no information. Dissidents who mail fight letters and other 
campaign materials but who do not mail a separate proxy state-
ment and voting form receive preliminary information on the ag-
gregate votes cast with respect to the director or issue they target 
but no broker-specific voting information.173 Unless Broadridge 
were to make significant changes in these policies, dissidents in 
proxy access would receive substantially less preliminary voting in-
formation than companies do or than dissidents would receive in 
traditional proxy contests. 
That such disparate access to preliminary voting information is a 
material disadvantage is corroborated by Professor Yair Listokin’s 
study of the voting outcome of management-sponsored propos-
als.174 In these proposals, as under proxy access, shareholders can 
vote for or against the proposal on the company’s proxy card, and 
shareholders can campaign without having to file a proxy state-
ment.175 As Listokin has shown, the voting outcome on these reso-
lutions is highly skewed: management is overwhelmingly more 
likely to win votes by a small margin than to lose by a small margin. 
The most likely explanation is that management uses information 
about the votes cast prior to the close of balloting and, when it ap-
pears that the vote is close, makes enhanced efforts to obtain addi-
tional votes for its side. The data presented by Listokin suggest 
that these efforts are rather successful: of 68 “close” votes (with a 
final voting result of between 47% and 53% for the management 
proposal), management won 61 votes.176 If one assumes that, with-
 
173 Personal communication with Charles V. Callan, Chief Regulatory Officer, 
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Oct. 25, 2010). 
174 Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 Am. L. & Econ. 
Rev. 159, 175–78 (2008). 
175 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) (2010). 
176 See Listokin, supra note 174, at 179 tbl. 5. 
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out the strategic advantage conferred on management by unilateral 
access to preliminary voting results, management would have lost 
half (or 34) of the close votes, then the effect of the strategic ad-
vantage is that 27 of these 34 losses—or 79%—turned into man-
agement wins. Even this 79% estimate understates the significance 
of superior preliminary voting information since it assumes that 
there were no contests which were close but which ended up, due 
to enhanced efforts, not being close after all. Moreover, we believe 
that Listokin’s study picks up mostly the effect of some last-minute 
use of preliminary voting information and thus understates the 
benefits of disparate access to such information. 
5. Cumulative Voting 
Proxy access involves a special disadvantage for the few compa-
nies that permit shareholders to use cumulative voting in the elec-
tion of directors. In cumulative voting, a shareholder is given as 
many votes per share as there are board positions to be filled and is 
allowed to cast those votes for one nominee or to distribute them 
in any way among the nominees. Cumulative voting, if used strate-
gically, permits a minority of shareholders to secure minority board 
representation by cumulating all their votes on a single nominee. 
Consider a company with 1 million shares and a 9-member, annu-
ally elected board. Under regular voting, each shareholder can cast 
1 vote per share for up to 9 nominees. In such a system, a share-
holder group that controls 500,001 of the shares can secure the 
election of all 9 nominees. Thus, even a group that controls 499,999 
votes is not assured of getting even a single nominee elected. Un-
der cumulative voting, a nominee who gets 900,001 votes is assured 
election.177 Since any shareholder can cast all 9 of her votes for a 
single nominee, it takes only 100,001 shares—roughly 10%—to be 
assured of electing 1 nominee to the board. 
To employ cumulative voting strategically, a dissident must ide-
ally get proxies that give the dissident discretion to decide how to 
cast the votes after the dissident knows the approximate level of 
shareholder support for its nominees. In proxy contests in compa-
 
177 There are a total of 9 million votes to be cast, and the nominees with the 9 highest 
vote levels are elected. If a nominee gets 900,001 votes, it is thus impossible that 9 
other nominees each get more votes. Thus, that nominee is assured of being elected. 
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nies with cumulative voting, proxies and voting instructions are de-
signed to provide such discretion. Under proxy access, this is 
unlikely to occur. The specific design of proxies and voting instruc-
tions for board elections involving cumulative voting is unclear. 
Most likely, however, the proxies and voting instructions would re-
semble those distributed in elections not involving cumulative vot-
ing, meaning that 1—and only 1—vote will be cast for each nomi-
nee marked on the ballot. After all, if votes are to be cumulated, 
then someone has to decide how to cumulate them, and there is no 
likely candidate for doing so in proxy access.178 This means, in ef-
fect, that by using proxy access, a dissident would forego the sig-
nificant advantage conferred by cumulative voting on dissidents 
seeking minority representation. 
6. Adverse Signal 
A final adverse effect of proxy access is that its use would convey 
a negative signal about the dissident. As discussed,179 proxy access 
would generate modest cost savings but entail substantial strategic 
disadvantages. For larger holders, the only ones eligible to use 
proxy access under the SEC-adopted rule, these costs savings 
would represent a trivial percentage of the value of the their 
stakes. Take a typical midcap company, with a capitalization of 
about $5 billion. A 3% stake in that company would amount to 
$150 million. According to our estimates, the cost savings from 
proxy access would amount to 1 or 2 hundredths of 1% of that 
stake. 
Now suppose that a dissident has a 3% stake, that the cost sav-
ings from proxy access are 0.03% of the dissident’s stake, and that 
using proxy access would reduce the dissident’s chances of winning 
by 10%. What would using proxy access signal about the dissident’s 
view of the expected gains from winning a contest? If the dissident 
believed that winning the contest would increase the stock price by 
0.3% or more, the dissident should forego proxy access and wage a 
traditional contest, because the benefits of using a traditional con-
 
178 Normally the person who solicits the proxies or the appointed proxy decides how 
to cumulate the votes, but in proxy access this person has interests adverse to those of 
the dissident shareholder. 
179 See supra Section III.A; Subsections III.B.1–5. 
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test would outweigh the cost savings from proxy access. In such a 
case, a dissident’s decision to opt for proxy access would convey a 
signal that the dissident does not believe that winning the contest 
would have a material effect on the stock price. Such a signal, of 
course, would be unlikely to attract votes. 
C. Empirical Assessment 
1. Number of Nominees 
One important limitation of the proxy access rule is that a dissi-
dent may not nominate more than 25% of the board.180 To assess 
the importance of that limitation, we examined the seats sought in 
traditional proxy contests. In our sample of 129 contests, the dissi-
dent sought a majority of the total seats in 23% of the contests and 
more than 25% of the seats in 91% of the contests. Hedge funds 
were less likely to seek control, or more than 25%, of the seats 
(13% and 88%, respectively), but dissidents other than hedge 
funds were substantially more likely to do so (44% and 95%, re-
spectively). In sum, judging from traditional campaigns, the limita-
tion on the numbers of seats sought is an important disadvantage, 
especially for dissidents other than hedge funds who often seek 
control.  
2. Success Rates and Margins 
As discussed, using proxy access rather than waging a traditional 
proxy contest entails several significant disadvantages that render 
it more difficult to gain the requisite shareholder support.181 To es-
timate the size of these disadvantages and their impact on the out-
come of proxy contests, we performed a number of calculations. 
First, for our sample of traditional proxy contests, we calculated 
the increase in the implicit vote threshold assuming (i) that the dis-
sident nominates the maximum number of candidates permissible 
by the proxy access rule and (ii) that shareholders who support the 
dissident will cast their remaining votes for company nominees and 
spread these votes evenly among the nominees. Under these as-
sumptions, the average level of support required to win increased 
 
180 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(d) (2010). 
181 See supra Section III.B. 
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from a majority to 71% of the shares voted for a nominee. As dis-
cussed, the second of these assumptions is extreme.182 More rea-
sonably, the implicit vote threshold would rise by about half that 
amount to roughly 60% of the shares voted for a nominee. In addi-
tion, we estimate that not having one’s own proxy card, having to 
fight in the dark, and sending an adverse signal, together would 
cost a dissident another 5% of the votes. 
In our sample of proxy contests in which a vote was held, dissi-
dents won outright in 35 contests, dissidents won some seats in 9 
contests, and management won in 52 contests. In the 44 contests in 
which dissidents won some seats, 3 involved cumulative voting. In 
these contests, proxy access entails even more severe disadvan-
tages. For the 41 other contests, we calculated the swing—that is, 
the percentage shift in votes from the dissident to the management 
nominees—necessary for a dissident nominee to lose.183 
Table 5: Results of Proxy Contests 












> $500 million 
Percentage of Total 
Dissident Victories— 
Capitalization < $500 
million 
< 1% 4 9.8 15.4 7.1 
1% - 2% 4 9.8 23.1 3.6 
2% - 5% 5 12.2 15.4 10.7 
5% - 7.5% 5 12.2 7.7 14.3 
7.5% - 10% 12 29.3 15.4 35.7 
10% - 15% 3 7.3 7.7 7.1 
15% - 20% 2 4.9 0 7.1 
20% - 30% 5 12.2 15.4 10.7 
30% - 35% 1 2.4 0 3.6 
 
If our quantification of the disadvantages of proxy access is cor-
rect, these data indicate that dissidents would have lost 33 of the 41 
 
182 See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
183 The swing was calculated by taking half of the difference between the votes for 
the dissident nominee who got the lowest number of votes but still got elected (the 
marginal dissident winner) and the votes for the management nominee who received 
the highest number of votes but did not get elected (the marginal management loser) 
and then dividing the difference by the number of the outstanding votes. 
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contests that they won as a result of these disadvantages. More-
over, elections tend to be closer for regular-sized than for micro-
cap companies.184 For regular-sized companies, 50% of the dissi-
dents who won would have lost had 5% of the votes swung the 
other way. And of the 4 contests in large companies (with a capi-
talization of more than $5 billion) in which dissidents gained board 
representation, 3 would have been lost had as little as 2% of the 
votes swung the other way. Thus, the disadvantages of proxy access 
are relatively more important for larger companies. 
The data on success rates and margins also indicate the diffi-
culty, if not futility, of winning a proxy access contest without ac-
tively campaigning. The level of campaigning varied greatly within 
the sample of traditional proxy contests, with some dissidents mail-
ing several fight letters to all shareholders and making presenta-
tions to large holders and others relying mostly on the proxy 
statement. However, in each serious contest, the campaign material 
distributed went substantially beyond the 500-word supporting 
statement permitted by the proxy access rule. Judging by the re-
sults of traditional contests, and taking into account the other dis-
advantages of proxy access, the chances of victory for a dissident 
who uses proxy access and does not campaign would be remote. 
3. Dissident Stakes and Savings 
These limited costs savings resulting from proxy access have to 
be evaluated not only in relation to the effect on winning the con-
tests but also in relation to the dollar value of the dissident stakes. 
As noted, these savings would normally amount to a few hun-
dredths of 1% of the value of a 3% stake. Moreover, successful dis-
sidents in traditional contests often seek and receive reimburse-
ment of their costs for waging a proxy contest. As between, on the 
one hand, waging a traditional contest, expending some more re-
sources, but having a material likelihood of succeeding and then 
possibly also getting the costs reimbursed; and, on the other hand, 
 
184 Just looking at the swing margins of prior contests probably understates the ad-
verse impact of proxy access. In contests which dissidents won by a large margin, it is 
likely that management—looking at the preliminary voting results—realized that it 
had no chance to win and stopped campaigning. But if the dissidents in these contests 
had been burdened by the disadvantages of proxy access, the preliminary results 
would have been much closer, and management might well have campaigned harder. 
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waging a proxy access contest, expending fewer resources, and hav-
ing a significantly reduced chance of succeeding and a correspond-
ingly reduced chance of receiving reimbursement for any addi-
tional campaign expenditures,185 the choice, we believe, would be 
an easy one. 
D. Summary and Evaluation 
Overall, for most dissidents, proxy access would not represent an 
attractive alternative. The reduced chances of winning associated 
with proxy access would generally outweigh the cost savings gener-
ated by it. For dissidents serious about winning, and who are con-
sidering significant outside campaigning (and spending the money 
on it), using proxy access makes little sense. 
IV. PROXY ACCESS VERSUS WITHHOLD VOTES 
Proxy access may be attractive for dissidents who do not plan to 
engage in outside campaigning and who are not really serious 
about winning. For these types of dissidents, the major advantage 
of proxy access is not merely a cost reduction but the virtual ab-
sence of any expenses. This has two implications: first, because the 
costs of making a proxy access nomination are very low, it may 
make sense to make a nomination even if the chances of success 
are low. As a result, we would expect many of these nominations to 
be unsuccessful. Second, some nominations may be made by dissi-
dents who are virtually certain that they will not win for reasons 
other than getting one’s nominee elected. These reasons may in-
clude trying to propagate certain ideas through the supporting 
 
185 Dissidents in traditional contests state whether they will seek reimbursement in 
their proxy statement, the granting of which is within the discretion of the board. If 
dissidents obtain control, they have the power to award themselves the reimburse-
ment. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal 
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1071, 1108–09 (1990). If they settle, 
the agreement sometimes provides for a reimbursement of expenses. If they obtain 
minority representation, they have at least an argument that shareholders wanted 
them to get reimbursed. Dissidents in proxy access contests can also seek reimburse-
ment but, in our view, are less likely to obtain reimbursement since (i) they will never 
have board control, (ii) they will never have stated in the proxy statement that they 
will seek reimbursement, and (iii) the board may take the position that the company 
already subsidized the proxy contest by providing proxy access and that no further 
reimbursement is warranted. 
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statement and gaining publicity for the shareholder and/or the 
nominee. 
But even for highly cost-conscious dissidents, another alternative 
presents itself. Instead of starting a proxy access contest, these dis-
sidents could use another, equally low-cost strategy: withhold their 
votes from some of the company nominees and perhaps engage in 
low-cost efforts to induce other shareholders to withhold their 
votes.186 In this Part, we examine this alternative. As we will show, 
even for highly cost-conscious dissidents, a withhold campaign will 
often be a better option than a proxy access contest. 
A. Plusses of Proxy Access: Effect of Winning 
A proxy access nomination entails one major plus over a with-
hold campaign: if the contest is successful, its effects are stronger, 
and more certain, than those of a withhold vote. The technical legal 
effect of a director receiving less than a majority of the votes cast in 
a withhold campaign depends on the voting rules in place at the 
corporation. Most companies subscribe to one of three different 
voting rules:187 the old, unmodified plurality regime that remains 
the default rule in Delaware and most other states;188 an official by-
law (or charter provision) that changes the default rule for uncon-
tested elections to a majority standard; or a “policy” adopted by 
the corporation to require each nominee to submit an irrevocable 
offer to resign from the board should she receive less than the ma-
jority of the votes cast in an uncontested election.189 
In companies with a plurality regime, in an uncontested election, 
a nominee who receives less than a majority of the votes is elected 
to the board just like a nominee who receives more than a major-
 
186 Such low-cost efforts may take the form of a press release explaining why the dis-
sident is withholding its votes, an amendment to the dissident’s Schedule 13D or 13G 
making such points, or a letter to proxy advisors urging them to recommend a with-
hold vote. Most dissidents who qualify for proxy access would be subscribing to the 
services of proxy advisors and would have sufficient financial clout to have their press 
releases picked up by wire services. 
187 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 987, 
1010 n.152 (2010). 
188 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216(3) (Supp. 2010). 
189 See id. § 141(b). 
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ity.190 In companies with a board policy, such a nominee is also 
elected, but the other board members have to decide whether to 
accept her resignation. Under a majority vote bylaw, the nominee 
who receives less than a majority is not elected. Nor, of course, is 
anyone else. But under Section 141(b) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, each director remains in office until her “succes-
sor is elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier resigna-
tion or removal.”191 Thus, if the nominee who receives less than a 
majority is a member of the incumbent board,192 she will remain in 
office until the vacancy created by her non-election is filled. Gen-
erally, the resulting vacancy can be filled by the board, and at least 
in theory nothing prevents the board from appointing that non-
elected nominee to the vacancy created by her non-election.193 
 
190 In uncontested elections, the number of nominees is the same as the number of 
board seats to fill, so it technically takes just a single vote to get the requisite plurality. 
191 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(b). 
192 The nominee would not remain on the board as a holdover if she had not been an 
incumbent. Also, the statute is not clear as to who would remain as a holdover if two 
of the incumbent directors are not re-elected and a single vacancy is created. This can 
occur, for example, where one of the incumbents does not run for re-election and the 
other runs but fails to receive the requisite majority. Since directors run for the board 
as a whole, rather than for specific seats, there is no a priori way to distinguish be-
tween these two potential holdover directors. The latter hypothetical raises the issue 
of whether the statute ought to be applied at all to a situation where some nominees 
are elected and others are not. Though phrased in terms of an individual director 
(“[e]ach director shall hold office”), it may make more sense to view the provision as 
applying to the whole board; that is, a board remains in place until a successor board 
is elected. See id. An election where some, but not all, nominees fail to get a majority 
would then produce a vacancy without any holdover directors, which does not gener-
ate much of a problem. Moreover, such an interpretation would avoid several prob-
lematic scenarios, for example, one where several board members fail to get a major-
ity, remain as holdover directors, and then appoint themselves to the vacancies over 
the objection of board members who were properly elected. 
193 For a recent Delaware opinion on majority vote bylaws, see City of Westland Po-
lice & Fire Retirement System v. Axcelis Technologies., Inc., 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010). 
Axcelis involved a board-adopted bylaw that mandated that a director who did not 
receive a majority of the votes tender her resignation but which also gave the board 
discretion whether to accept the resignation. See id. at 283–84. In determining 
whether plaintiffs had established “proper purpose” to inspect books and records un-
der Delaware General Corporation Law, tit. 8, § 220(b), the Delaware Supreme 
Court upheld the Chancery Court’s finding that a board decision not to accept the 
resignation did not by itself establish a credible basis to infer wrongdoing. Id. at 291. 
In so holding, the Delaware Supreme Court held that such board decisions, without 
additional evidence showing an entrenchment motive, are to be analyzed under the 
business judgment rule and not the Unocal or Blasius tests, even if they take place 
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Moreover, independent of the technical effect, a nominee (and 
the company on the board of which he serves) who receives less 
than a majority without having an opponent, or even a substantial 
withhold percentage short of a majority, suffers substantial embar-
rassment. Shareholders are sending a message to such companies, 
and companies may respond to these messages regardless of the 
technical effect of the withhold vote. In addition, the threatened in-
fliction of such embarrassment gives shareholders leverage.194 
Compare these effects to the effect of a successful proxy access 
contest. Should the shareholder nominee receive more votes than 
one of the company nominees, the shareholder nominee would be 
elected and the company nominee who received fewest votes 
would not be elected.195 How important this is in practice depends 
to a large degree on the level of recalcitrance of the board majority 
and on the person elected. Proxy access would not afford share-
holders the opportunity to elect a majority of the board. By inten-
tion and design, shareholder nominees elected via proxy access 
would thus be a minority. Since board decisions are generally taken 
 
during a battle for control. Id. at 288–91. The narrow ruling, however, may well not 
apply to shareholder-adopted majority voting bylaws or to better-crafted Section 220 
requests that focus on investigating the suitability of directors whose resignations 
were rejected. 
194 It also deserves mention that, under the law of Delaware and some other states, 
shareholders can adopt a majority bylaw which could not then be amended by the 
board. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216(b) (Supp. 2010) (codifying amendment 
adopted in 2006 to provide binding bylaws adopted by shareholders that prescribe 
vote requirements for director elections). Other states that have adopted legislation 
to enable shareholders to provide for forms of majority voting include California, Ne-
vada, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See Claudia H. Allen, 
Majority Voting in Director Elections—An Activist Success Story, Neal, Gerber & 
Eisenberg LLP (Nov. 13 2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx?
ID=777. Such a bylaw could be proposed via a binding shareholder resolution under 
Rule 14a-8. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216 (“A bylaw amendment adopted by stock-
holders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors 
shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors.”). Thus, to the 
extent that the plurality regime or a resignation policy is not sufficiently effective, in 
most companies shareholders can take action to adopt a more effective majority vot-
ing bylaw. 
195 In many instances, the board could place the non-elected company nominee on 
the board by expanding the board size and filling the resulting vacancy with the com-
pany nominee. 
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by majority vote,196 the elected board nominees, if voting together, 
could always outvote the elected shareholder nominee. 
Even having a seat at the table where decisions are made is, 
upon final analysis, contingent. The board could, at its first meet-
ing, create a board committee—consisting of all board members 
except the shareholder nominee—and delegate to this committee 
most board powers, effectively shutting the shareholder nominee 
out of the discussion and information process.197 While such an ex-
treme measure may be unlikely, boards have significant discretion 
over what matters are primarily decided in committee and over 
who sits on which committee. Thus, through the proper work divi-
sion and committee membership designation, the participation of 
the shareholder nominee in the discussion and information process 
could be reduced.198 
B. Minuses of Proxy Access 
While proxy access has an advantage over a withhold campaign, 
it also entails substantial disadvantages: the likelihood of winning a 
withhold vote is significantly higher than the likelihood of winning 
a proxy access contest, and a good showing short of victory in a 
withhold vote may have a greater effect than a close loss in a proxy 
access campaign. 
 
196 It is possible to change this by bylaw, but it would probably require an active so-
licitation. 
197 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (Supp. 2010) (permitting delegation of any 
power to such a committee other than the power to approve or recommend any ac-
tion that requires shareholder approval and the power to amend bylaws). 
198 This could be done in a subtle and discreet manner so that the sidelining of the 
shareholder nominee would be less apparent. All of this, of course, presupposes that 
the shareholder nominee would differ significantly from the board nominees along 
dimensions other than the fact that she was selected by shareholders and that the 
other board members, for that reason, would want to sideline her. On this issue, as 
well, there are some doubts. Also note that directors have information rights under 
state law and thus cannot be shut out completely from the information process. Id. 
§ 220(d). In public companies, however, the additional information that comes from 
these information rights, and the capacity to use it, are very limited. 
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1. Higher Voting Threshold 
As explained in the preceding Part,199 it takes more votes to suc-
ceed in the proxy access contest than in a traditional proxy contest. 
This is equally true when comparing a proxy access contest to a 
withhold vote. To generate a majority withhold vote that results in 
a nominee not being elected or triggers her resignation, sharehold-
ers must cast more “withhold” than “for” votes for a specific nomi-
nee, with abstentions and non-votes being ignored. As a result, it 
just takes a majority of the voting shares to generate a majority 
withhold vote. But, as discussed above, it will likely take a substan-
tially greater fraction of the voting shares to get a nominee elected 
via proxy access. 
2. Negative Versus Positive Campaigning 
A further disadvantage of a proxy access campaign compared to 
a withhold vote is that it would be more difficult to get shareholder 
support for a proxy access campaign. First, and most fundamen-
tally, it is easier to get other shareholders to agree to be against 
something than to be in favor of something. In a withhold cam-
paign, other shareholders just have to agree to oppose a specific 
company nominee. By contrast, in a proxy access campaign, they 
are asked to put the dissident nominee on the board instead of a 
company nominee. Even if these other shareholders believe that 
the present board or a certain director has not done a good job and 
would thus want either to send a general message to the board to 
mend its ways or to remove a specific director, they may not neces-
sarily agree that putting the dissident nominee on the board would 
lead to an improvement. 
The purely negative structure of withhold votes also means that 
they involve little downside risk. So what if a qualified company 
nominee receives a majority withhold vote? Unless the nominee is 
the company’s CEO, she can probably be replaced by another simi-
larly qualified director. This may generate some work, but has no 
material impact on the company. Moreover, as explained below, a 
majority withhold vote may not result in the removal of the direc-
tor from the board, but instead generate other sought-after 
 
199 See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
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changes.200 In comparison, placing a dissident nominee who does 
not deserve election on the board is potentially more serious busi-
ness. Put differently, the very advantage of a proxy access con-
test—that, if it succeeds, it is certain to replace a board member 
with a dissident nominee—may lead shareholders to be more 
guarded in voting for a dissident nominee than in withholding their 
vote from a company nominee. 
It will be especially difficult to make the affirmative case for vot-
ing for the dissident nominee without significant campaigning. 
While dissidents would get to include a 500-word supporting 
statement in the company’s proxy materials,201 this is very limited 
space to make such an affirmative case. At the very minimum, we 
believe, the dissident would ordinarily have to supplement the 
supporting statement with low-level campaign efforts, such as press 
releases and letters soliciting the support from proxy advisors.202 
But even with such supplements, it will not be easy to explain con-
vincingly to other shareholders why electing the dissident nominee 
would be in their interest. 
Moreover, proxy access opens the door to more effective cam-
paigning by the company. In withhold contests, the ability of the 
company to campaign is somewhat limited by the nature of the 
contest. The company nominee targeted for a withhold vote is run-
ning against no one. To campaign, the company has to argue, in ef-
fect, that the company nominee is doing a good enough job to de-
serve being elected. This positive campaigning can be difficult—
usually nominees targeted for a withhold vote have been so tar-
geted for a reason—and implicitly draws attention to the nominee’s 
shortcomings. By contrast, in a proxy access campaign, the com-
pany could attack the dissident’s nominees via negative campaign-
ing. Even casual observation of political campaigns suggests that 
 
200 See infra Section IV.C. 
201 See supra text accompanying note 147. 
202 If the dissident goes much beyond such efforts and makes a mailing to sharehold-
ers, it will probably pay to wage a traditional contest rather than a proxy access con-
test. 
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this is much easier than positive campaigning.203 In fact, in tradi-
tional proxy contests, such attacks are common.204 
The company may not merely attack the dissident nominee. It 
may also attack the dissident shareholder who made the nomina-
tion. Such attacks are particularly likely to be credible and effective 
if the dissident shareholder has arguable conflicts of interest. Most 
evidently, allegations of conflicts can be made for dissident share-
holders who are affiliated with labor and employee interests. Other 
shareholders, who are interested predominantly in maximizing the 
economic value of the stakes, may worry that a nominee put forth 
by such groups will push the company to pursue the labor interests 
at the expense of profit maximization or that lending support to 
such a candidate will provide leverage to labor groups to extract 
concessions in exchange for withdrawing the nomination. In addi-
tion, public pension funds and hedge funds are vulnerable to being 
attacked for alleged conflicts. The boards of trustees of public pen-
sion funds typically consist of political appointees, politicians serv-
ing ex officio, or beneficiary representatives.205 Beneficiary repre-
sentatives often have ties to organized labor.206 Thus, public 
pension fund trustees, who have little personal financial stake in 
maximizing the returns of the funds, may plausibly pursue other in-
terests. Politicians and political appointees may purse political 
 
203 See, e.g., Eric Ferkenhoff, Icahn Appears to Fall Short at Motorola, N.Y. Times, 
May 8, 2007, at C1 (detailing personal criticisms by Icahn of Motorola’s board). 
204 See, e.g., The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders, Defini-
tive Additional Proxy Materials Filed by Non-Registrant (Form DFAN 14A) (Jan. 18, 
2007) [hereinafter The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864683/000119312507008489/
ddfan14a.htm (containing a fight letter by dissidents citing to and refuting attacks by 
company). 
205 See, e.g., Board Members, CalPERS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
index.jsp?bc=/about/organization/board/members/home.xml; Structure and Respon-
sibilities, CalPERS (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/
organization/board/structure-responsibilities.xml. 
206 See, e.g., Benn Steil, California’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 
2008, at A14 (“Calpers is a political entity in every sense of the word. Its board is 
comprised of . . . six elected members—all six of whom have long ties to organized la-
bor, including the board president . . . who is also executive vice president of the Cali-
fornia Labor Federation. Calpers’s investment policies are politically driven, often 
dictated by the legislature, and even involve foreign policy goals.”). 
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goals such as increasing in-state investment,207 getting favorable PR, 
or benefiting significant donors.208 Beneficiary representatives may 
pursue labor goals. 
These issues have particular salience for some of the most activ-
ist public pension funds. CalPERS, the New York State Retire-
ment Fund, and the New York City Pension Funds have all been 
involved in “pay to play” scandals.209 CalPERS has been criticized 
for the presence of union representatives on its board and the pro-
union stance it has taken in various labor disputes.210 The New 
York City Pension Funds, though making a fair number of govern-
ance proposals, make more than twice as many social and envi-
ronmental proposals and tout the engagement of (former) Comp-
troller William Thompson—the ex officio chief investment advisor 
of the funds—on climate change.211 Former New York State and 
 
207 See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 796–98 (1993). 
208 See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Cuomo Issues 100 Subpoenas in Pension Fund Inquiry, 
N.Y. Times, May 2, 2009, at A17. 
209 See id. (discussing investigation by Attorney General Cuomo into pay to play in 
New York pension funds); Craig Karmin & Peter Lattman, Calpers Rocked By ‘Pay 
to Play,’ Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A1 (discussing pay to play at CalPERS). 
210 See Calpers and Cronyism, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 2004, at A18 (noting political and 
union ties of CalPERS board members and accusing board of basing investment deci-
sion on political goals of labor and the Democratic Party); Jim Carlton & Jonathan 
Weil, Ouster Isn’t Expected to Alter Calpers Policy, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at C3 
(noting that CalPERS has been criticized for “meddling in political and labor-union 
issues with little connection to improving shareholder returns”); Jonathan Weil & 
Joann S. Lublin, Gadfly Activism at Calpers Leads to Possible Ouster of President, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2004, at A1 (noting controversial CalPERS actions in interceding 
on behalf of striking employees of a portfolio company). 
211 The New York City Pension Funds’ 2006 Shareholder Proposals, The New York 
City Pension Funds 4–17 (2006), http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bam/
corp_gover_pdf/2006-shareholder-report.pdf; see also id. at 4 (“Comptroller Thomp-
son has played a leading role in the efforts of the Investor Network on Climate Risk 
(INCR) . . . . INCR has taken steps to pressure Wall Street firms, securities regulators 
and companies to provide deeper analysis and disclosure on the business risks and 
opportunities of climate change. In June 2006, Comptroller Thompson joined with 27 
members of INCR in a letter to SEC Chairman Cox expressing concern that climate 
change poses material risks to companies in which INCR members are invested . . . . 
On September 20, 2006, the New York City Comptroller’s Office participated in a 
meeting between INCR members and SEC Commissioner Roel Campos in an effort 
to push the SEC towards the adoption of an SEC rule that would require companies 
to disclose climate change risks in their financial reports. Commissioner Campos ex-
pressed deep interest in the issue and offered his active participation in advancing the 
initiative.”); Postseason Report 2007 Shareholder Proposal Programs & Other Share-
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New York City Comptroller Alan Hevesi (and the head of the re-
spective pension systems) pled guilty to charges of defrauding the 
government212 and to more serious felony corruption charges for 
awarding pension investment business in exchange for gifts.213 The 
current New York City Comptroller John Liu has been criticized 
for using a trip to Ireland to gain political, rather than investment, 
returns.214 
3. Finding a Nominee 
Given the possibility of highly one-sided campaigning and of get-
ting attacked and not defended, one wonders who would agree to 
become a dissident nominee. The dissident would want to nomi-
nate a person with experience, a good track record, independence, 
and an unimpeachable character to minimize susceptibility to nega-
tive campaigning against the nominee or the dissident herself. 
Warren Buffet, to use an extreme example, may not have to worry 
much about negative ads and, even if nominated by a union pen-
sion fund, may receive a lot of shareholder support. The Warren 
Buffets of this world, of course, usually have better things to do 
than run as dissident nominees. Someone less famous and accom-
plished than Buffet may well have second thoughts about entering 
a campaign in which she can expect to be attacked and have her re-
cord presented in the least favorable light by a company with sig-
nificant campaign funds, while the dissident who nominated her 
 
ownership Initiatives of the New York City Pension Funds & Retirement Systems, 
The New York City Pension Funds & Retirement Systems 4 (2007), 
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bam/corp_gover_pdf/2007-Shareholder-
report.pdf (“On March 19, 2007, Comptroller Thompson joined with Ceres, dozens of 
institutional investors, and a dozen leading U.S. companies and called on U.S. law-
makers to enact strong federal legislation to address global climate change . . . . The 
investors and companies emphasized their concerns that the uncertainty surrounding 
climate policy and the lack of federal regulations may be undermining the long-term 
competitiveness of companies by discouraging new investments in clean energy and 
energy-efficient technologies.”). 
212 See Michael Cooper, Hevesi Pleads Guilty to a Felony and Resigns, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 23, 2006, at B1. 
213 Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, Hevesi Pleads Guilty in Pension Case, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2010, at A19. 
214 See Michael Corkery & Michael Howard Saul, Comptroller’s Ireland Trip Ques-
tioned, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 2010, at A17. 
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will make little effort, and expend minimal funds, to defend her.215 
To be sure, for the right price, nominees can be found or the dissi-
dent can simply nominate one of its own officials. But this involves 
expense (if the dissident ends up paying the nominee), and, more 
importantly, it reduces the independence of the nominee from the 
dissident shareholder (if the nominee is paid or is an official with 
the dissident) and increases the credibility of accusations of con-
flict. 
4. Effect of “Losing” 
The final drawback of proxy access compared to a withhold 
campaign relates to the effect of losing. In a proxy access cam-
paign, if the dissident nominees are not elected, the company can 
claim victory and vindication: shareholders have been offered a 
real choice between two live candidates and rejected the candidate 
nominated by the dissident. 
In a withhold vote, by contrast, the company may be the de facto 
loser even if its candidate receives more “for” than “withhold” 
votes. Getting a substantial, but less than a majority, withhold vote 
is still an embarrassment and often induces board actions. Having, 
say, 40% of the shareholders withhold their vote from you in order 
to vote for no one is quite different from having an opponent in a 
contested election get 40% to your 60%. In the mother-of-all with-
hold campaigns—the 2004 campaign against Disney CEO Michael 
Eisner—Eisner received a majority “for” vote but was nevertheless 
ousted shortly thereafter.216 This experience is not singular. For ex-
ample, after some directors received a 25% withhold vote, Interna-
tional Paper decided to heed shareholder requests to dismantle its 
staggered board.217 According to proxy solicitors, some companies 
regard withhold percentages of as low as 15-20% as problematic 
 
215 See The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders, supra note 204 
(containing a dissident mailing defending the record of its nominees against attacks 
from company). 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 59–63. 
217 News Release, International Paper, International Paper Board of Directors An-
nounces Annual Director Elections (Oct. 17, 2007), http://investor.
internationalpaper.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=73062&p=irol-newsArticle_Print&ID=1064
053&highlight=. 
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and will make additional solicitation efforts to increase the “for” 
votes.218 
C. Empirical Assessment 
Among Russell 3000 companies, 82 director nominees in 2009 
and 31 directors nominees in 2008 received a majority withhold 
vote in uncontested elections.219 Of these nominees, 7 were running 
for board seats at companies that had adopted a resignation policy, 
and one was running at a company that had implemented a major-
ity standard for election to the board. 
Of the 113 nominees with majority withholds, 4 (the director 
subject to a majority standard and 3 subject to a regular plurality 
standard) were not elected or resigned, and one director died 
within a year.220 However, even for most of the other 108 directors, 
the majority withhold votes had a substantial impact that appears 
to have satisfied the concerns that triggered the withhold votes in 
the first instance. 
To determine the basis for the withhold vote, we examined the 
voting recommendations by ISS, the most influential proxy advisor, 
which state the reason for any withhold recommendation.221 These 
reasons fell into 6 categories: failure to attend at least 75% of the 
board meetings, membership on an excessive number of boards, 
lack of independence (often coupled with service on certain com-
mittees, adoption of a poison pill without shareholder approval, 
failure to implement shareholder proposal that received majority 
support, and compensation-related issues. This listing suggests that 
 
218 Personal communication with Alan Miller, Co-chairman, Innisfree M&A, Inc. 
(June 4, 2010).  
219 Gretchen Morgenson, Too Many ‘No’ Votes To Be Ignored, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
20, 2009, at BU1. There were 84 directors in 2009 and 32 in 2008, but two of these di-
rectors (of Zapata Corp.) were not elected because different director candidates re-
ceived a higher vote than they did, and for one further (of Alico), the company had 
agreed to support a different nominee in his stead. We thus disregarded these 3 direc-
tors. 
220 The respective companies with directors subject to a resignation policy did not 
accept any of the 7 resignations. 
221 See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 105, at 869, 871. We caution that the ISS ra-
tionale is not necessarily the only reason why directors receive withhold votes. In fact, 
many directors for whom ISS issues a withhold recommendation for the same reason, 
and sometimes at the same company and the same year as the nominees who received 
majority withholds, receive a majority “for” vote. 
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often the main aim of the withhold recommendation is to induce 
corporate changes, rather than to remove the director at issue from 
the board. The reaction of companies and shareholders we discuss 
below suggests that this is indeed the case. 
For the nominees who did not leave the board within one year 
and whose companies were not acquired or about to be acquired 
by the next annual meeting (98 nominees), we considered whether 
they were re-nominated, whether the company had taken any steps 
to address the shareholder concern, and how the nominees at issue 
fared in the 2010 board elections. Specifically, for those nominees 
who were re-nominated, we judged whether the company had ade-
quately addressed the issue by the percentage of withhold votes 
they received the following year. Generally, if the nominee re-
ceived less than 10% withholds, we considered the company as 
having addressed the issue to the satisfaction of shareholders and if 
the nominee received more than 40% withholds, we considered the 
company as not having addressed the issue to the satisfaction of 
shareholders.222 When the board was staggered and the nominee 
was not up for reelection the following year, or when the nominee 
received between 10% and 40% withholds, we considered several 
factors, including (i) our own evaluation of the company’s response 
to the ISS basis for a withhold recommendation, (ii) the presence 
of a secondary reason that may have accounted for the majority 
withhold vote and whether the company addressed that reason, 
and (iii) the withhold percentage received by other board nomi-
nees. For nominees who received withhold votes in 2008, we fur-
ther judged whether that reason was addressed in the second year 
following the withhold vote. Based on our evaluation, 67 of the 98 
withhold votes resulted in a company response that was satisfac-
tory (including 2 in which the nominee was not re-nominated and 7 
relating to a 2008 withhold vote that were addressed in the second 
year following the vote);223 28 did not result in a satisfactory re-
sponse (including 2 in which the nominee received another major-
ity withhold vote in the following year); and in 3 instances, it was 
unclear whether the response was satisfactory or not. 
 
222 Note that for 2010 results, unlike for 2009 and 2008, shares voted by brokers 
without instructions from the beneficial owner are not included in the “for” vote 
count. 
223 2 of these 7 directors received a second withhold vote in 2009. 
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Note that the cases in which the response was not satisfactory 
were concentrated among smaller companies. Of the 28 nominees 
in companies with unsatisfactory responses, none were directors at 
an S&P 500 large-cap company, 3 were directors at an S&P 400 
mid-cap company, and 24 were directors at an S&P 600 small-cap 
company. By comparison, for the 10 nominees at S&P 500 compa-
nies, every company addressed the concerns that gave rise to the 
withhold vote.  Another notable aspect of the data is the rarity of 
majority withhold votes at companies that had adopted a majority 
standard for the election of directors and, to a lesser extent, at 
companies with a resignation policy. This may be due to any of the 
following factors: companies with a majority standard for election 
or with resignation policies may be more successful in avoiding ma-
jority withhold votes because they campaign more heavily for “for” 
votes; shareholders at companies with a majority standard for elec-
tion or with resignation policies may be more careful in voting 
“withhold” if this may result in a majority withhold vote since their 
real aim is to induce the company or the director to make changes, 
rather than remove the director from the board; companies with a 
majority standard for election or with resignation policies may ad-
dress the shareholder concerns before they result in a majority 
withhold vote; or withhold campaigns may be used to pressure 
companies to adopt majority voting. To the extent that either of 
the first 2 reasons account for the scarcity of majority withhold 
votes, they would result, to an even greater extent, in a scarcity of 
successful proxy access contests. 
When a withhold vote did occur, the margin tended to be nar-
row. The average (median) percentages of the shares voting with-
hold, relative to the shares voting either “for” or “withhold,” were 
56.25% (54.89%) in 2009 and were 55.11% (55.57%) in 2008. The 
withhold percentage exceeded 60% in only 24 votes and never ex-
ceeded 70%.224 
 
224 These figures, however, somewhat understate the degree of shareholder opposi-
tion. In 2008 and 2009, uninstructed shares held through brokers could still be voted 
for the company nominees. To estimate the degree to which such shares may have re-
duced the withhold vote margin, we considered whether another issue (such as a 
shareholder proposal) was on the ballot for which uninstructed shares could not be 
voted. This permitted us to estimate the number of uninstructed shares. We then as-
sumed, conservatively, that all these shares had been voted for the board nominees. 
(During 2009, about one-half of uninstructed shares were voted, by each broker, in 
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The set of nominees who received majority withhold votes may 
represent a potentially fertile set of targets for proxy access. Obvi-
ously, these nominees already face substantial opposition from 
shareholders. Nevertheless, we do not believe that dissident nomi-
nees would have had an easy time prevailing against most of these 
nominees. 
First, the principal reason for the withhold nominations may not 
be known by the time a dissident has to make a proxy access nomi-
nation. For example, the company discloses whether directors at-
tended at least 75% of the meetings only when it files its proxy 
statement. At that point, however, it would be too late for a dissi-
dent to nominate someone else to defeat a director who had missed 
many meetings. 
Second, as later developments indicate, many if not most of 
these withhold votes were aimed at achieving a corporate change 
other than the removal of the director at issue. Regardless of the 
reason for the ISS withhold recommendation, the nominees seem 
to be able to receive a large majority in the next board election as 
long as the company takes proper rectifying measures. Take, for 
example, Syniverse Holdings, where all 8 directors received major-
ity withhold votes in 2009. The reason for the ISS withhold rec-
ommendation was that the company adopted a poison pill without 
shareholder approval. The company then promised that the pill 
would either be terminated or submitted to a shareholder vote in 
2011, and the directors were reelected in 2010 with a 94% “for” 
vote margin.225 Or take Sir Peter Bonfield, who attended fewer than 
75% of the board meetings of Mentor Graphics and received a ma-
 
the same proportion as the actual instructions received by that broker. See 
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., Broadridge Report on Rule 452: The Elimina-
tion of the Broker Vote for Director Elections—Analysis of the Impact During the 
First Proxy Season 25–31 (2010), available at www.broadridgeinfo.com/.%20.%20./
MASTER%20Steering%20Comm%2010-19-10%20FINAL.pdf). We subtracted the 
respective number from the “for” votes received by the nominee and recalculated the 
withhold vote margin. Using this methodology for the 2009 withhold votes, the aver-
age and median withhold vote margins rose by about 6.5%. 
 Note, however, that once uninstructed broker shares may no longer be voted, the 
company may make enhanced efforts to induce holders to submit voting instructions. 
As a result, our methodology may result in an overestimate of the withhold vote mar-
gin. 
225 Syniverse Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1169264/000119312510112812/d8k.htm. 
KAHANROCK_BOOK 9/15/20117:46 PM 
1424 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1347 
jority withhold vote in 2009. His attendance record improved in the 
following year and he was reelected in 2010 with 93% of the vote.226 
As a result, we do not believe that a majority withhold vote gener-
ally translates to majority support for a dissident nominee. 
Third, even shareholders who would ideally like to oust a certain 
director from the board may not vote for a dissident nominee be-
cause they consider the dissident nominee to be even worse. This 
may be the case because the dissident nominee lacks the proper 
professional qualifications, because shareholders distrust the dissi-
dent shareholder who made the nomination, or because they be-
lieve that election of a dissident would reduce board effectiveness. 
Fourth, as discussed, it is likely that a company would campaign 
more heavily—and more effectively—against a dissident nominee 
than it presently does when faced with a large withhold vote. At 
present, companies where nominees received a majority withhold 
vote engaged in little open campaigning.227 A small minority of 
companies mailed an additional letter to shareholders explaining 
why they should vote for certain nominees, and a few more mailed 
reminders to shareholders to vote, but most engaged in no open 
campaigning at all. If faced with a dissident nominee, we believe 
that this would be likely to change. 
In rare instances, however, a dissident nominee may succeed. 
Take Ralph Atkin, a director of Skywest who received a 63% 
withhold vote in 2009, presumably because of concerns about his 
independence. Apparently nothing was done, and in 2010 he re-
ceived a 68% withhold vote.228 Repeated ineffective withhold votes 
may eventually induce frustrated shareholders to support a dissi-
dent nominee. But then take Ralf Boer, a director of Plexus who 
received majority withhold votes in 2008 and 2009. Boer was a 
partner in a law firm that billed Plexus $500,000 in 2008, and, the 
following year, Plexus adopted a poison pill without shareholder 
 
226 Mentor Graphics Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/701811/000119312510153532/d8k.htm. 
227 By open campaigning, we mean campaigning that requires the company to make 
additional filings with the SEC. 
228 Skywest, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/793733/000110465910027128/a10-
6140_38k.htm. Though the withhold margin in 2010 appeared to have been higher, the 
withhold margin in 2009, when uninstructed broker votes are filtered out, as discussed 
supra note 222 and accompanying text, was 69%. 
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approval.229 By the time of the 2010 annual meeting, Boer’s law 
firm’s billings had dropped to $5,000, and, although the poison pill 
appears to have remained in place, Boer was reelected in 2010 with 
90% of the vote.230 Even repeated majority withhold votes thus may 
generate no hard feelings if the company shapes up. 
D. Summary and Evaluation 
A proxy access nomination, without significant outside cam-
paigning, may be a plausible alternative to a withhold campaign. In 
both cases, the costs are low, and success in a proxy access cam-
paign assures a change in board composition. Moreover, the fact 
that a majority of shareholders sometimes withholds its votes with-
out any open campaign shows that a proxy access nomination 
without campaigning is not necessarily doomed to fail. 
Nevertheless, we believe that successful proxy access nomina-
tions will be extremely rare. It will be harder to obtain the requisite 
majority because proxy access involves an implicitly higher voting 
threshold. It will be harder to obtain shareholder support because 
of the affirmative nature of the support required and concern over 
the dissident’s goals. It will be hard to find qualified nominees due 
to the lack of support they are receiving from the dissident. Finally, 
by the time proxy access nominations are due, it may not yet be 
clear which companies or company nominees would be most vul-
nerable to a proxy access campaign. 
And even as to companies or nominees who are clearly vulner-
able, there may not be a shareholder (or group of shareholders) 
who is both qualified to make a proxy access nomination and inter-
ested in doing so. As discussed, to be eligible to make a proxy ac-
cess nomination, a shareholder (or a group of shareholders) must 
have a sizeable equity stake of 3% and must satisfy a lengthy hold-
ing period of 3 years. No such requirements apply to a shareholder 
who wants to withhold its votes or encourage others to do so. 
Moreover, most large institutional investors, who would most eas-
ily satisfy these requirements, have been reluctant to become 
openly active but are perfectly willing to withhold votes from com-
 
229 Other Plexus directors did not receive a majority withhold vote. 
230 Plexus Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/785786/000095012310012127/c56287e8vk.htm. 
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pany nominees. We thus predict that withhold votes will remain 
the preferred method for shareholders to signal dissatisfaction to 
the company. 
V. MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE: THE MARGINAL IMPACT OF 
PROXY ACCESS 
We would expect proxy access to result in few nominations. Of 
the nominations made, few would result in the election of dissident 
directors. And the dissident directors elected would have little im-
pact on the companies. Thus, in our view, proxy access does not 
amount to much, and the statements made by the supporters and 
detractors of proxy access are greatly overblown. 
This being said, proxy access would have some marginal conse-
quences. In this Part, we discuss these effects: some positive, others 
negative. On the whole, the net effect of proxy access is likely to be 
close to zero and surely is not high enough to get very excited 
about. 
A. Costs 
Dissident nominations generate costs. Faced with the possibility 
that a dissident nominee will get elected to a board, the company 
may campaign against the nominee. In doing so, the company will, 
in effect, spend shareholders’ money. 
As we have argued before, we do not believe that proxy access 
would generate a slew of nominees. However, given the low costs 
of making a nomination and the possibility of goals other than get-
ting the nominee elected, nominations might be made even if the 
chances of success are highly remote. In fact, as discussed, we 
would expect that more serious dissidents would opt for a withhold 
campaign or a traditional proxy contest rather than for proxy ac-
cess and that proxy access would predominantly be used by dissi-
dents with low chances of success. 
On the other hand, the marginal cost to the company of includ-
ing the nominee and the supporting statement in its material is triv-
ial. For dissident nominees who stand virtually no chance of getting 
elected, the company would not need to expend material resources 
in assuring their defeat. As it is, companies already incur some—
although, we believe, lower—expenses to generate a high percent-
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age of “for” votes or to defeat shareholder proposals. This being 
said, any increase in campaign expenses generated by proxy access 
would be a downside that has to be weighed against any benefits 
produced by proxy access and companies, being risk averse, may 
end up spending a lot more than needed to defeat a marginal 
shareholder nominee. 
B. Unholy Alliance 
A second potential downside of proxy access relates to the pos-
sibility of dissident nominations by shareholder groups who pursue 
interests that diverge from the interests of shareholders as a whole. 
The Wall Street Journal, for example, editorialized that proxy ac-
cess will empower unions to threaten to run opposition candidates 
to extract political concessions, such as support for health care re-
form.231 Other groups, such as public pension funds, social-issue 
oriented funds, hedge funds, and former insiders, may have diver-
gent interests and may be tempted to use proxy access to advance 
their personal agendas. This is the “proxy access” equivalent of 
greenmail—and leaves shareholders worse off. 
While there is a possibility that proxy access may be abused by 
some shareholder groups, we do not think that any abuse would be 
likely to have a serious impact. First, any single union or union-
affiliated fund would very rarely own the requisite amount of stock 
to make nominations, and hedge funds would rarely satisfy the 3-
year holding period requirement. Thus, these shareholders would 
have to assemble groups of like-minded investors and even then 
would not easily be able to satisfy the thresholds. The same would 
be true, albeit to a lesser degree, for public pension funds. 
If these shareholders succeed in forming a group that meets the 
proxy access threshold requirements, they will have difficulty suc-
ceeding in extracting political concessions. As we argued above, 
the presence of, or even the suspicion of, divergent interests by the 
dissident makes it unlikely that nominees will succeed. Efforts to 
extract political concessions, or otherwise pursue personal inter-
ests, would be unlikely to stay secret for long. First, the company 
asked to make concessions would have a strong interest in reveal-
ing any request in order to discredit the dissident group. Second, if 
 
231 See Editorial, Alinsky Wins at the SEC, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 2010, at A14. 
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several shareholders must join the dissident group to satisfy the 
ownership threshold requirements, the likelihood of a leak from 
some member of the dissident group would increase. Third, the 
formation of a shareholder group would become public knowl-
edge.232 Once it becomes known that such a shareholder group was 
formed, that it threatened to make, but never did make, a proxy 
access nomination (or that it made one and withdrew it), and that 
around the same time the company changed its position on some 
matter of public policy or took some other action to benefit the 
special interests of these shareholders, then other market partici-
pants could deduce the link between these events. And once a 
shareholder has been publicly exposed, any future nominations by 
that shareholder would lack credibility. 
Put differently, it is exactly because market participants would 
be attuned to the danger that some shareholders could abuse proxy 
access that it is unlikely that such abuse would result in more than 
sporadic harm. 
C. Recalcitrant Companies 
As we argued in Parts III and IV, we believe that withhold cam-
paigns and traditional proxy contests are generally more effective 
ways for activists to achieve their goals than proxy access contests. 
Some companies, however, may lose a withhold campaign and still 
not mend their ways: the director at issue stays on the board and is 
re-nominated, and the board does not address the issue that 
prompted the high withhold vote or otherwise shape up. In these 
situations, the shareholders’ only recourse will be to withhold their 
votes again or to start a traditional proxy contest. For these recalci-
trant companies—which will overwhelmingly be micro-cap and 
small-cap companies—giving shareholders the additional option of 
proxy access may have some beneficial effects. Having snubbed 
shareholders once, the company stands an increased chance of los-
ing in a proxy access contest. The case for the nominee is relatively 
simple and has some inherent appeal: the board ignored share-
holder wishes expressed in a majority withhold vote and thus 
 
232 The knowledge will become public either because the attempt to form a group 
triggers filing requirements under Rules 14a-b(1) or (7) or because of the large num-
ber of persons who will become aware of the attempts to form a group. 
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stronger steps are needed. The threat of a specific board nominee 
generating such intense opposition from shareholders may induce 
the company to replace that nominee with a more acceptable can-
didate. 
This being said, one should not overstate the resulting benefits 
of proxy access. First, the number of recalcitrant companies is 
small. For 2009, there were only 11 companies in the Russell 3000 
in which one or more director received a majority withhold vote 
and the company failed to make a satisfactory response. 
Second, for some recalcitrant companies, it may be difficult to 
satisfy the shareholder requirements for a proxy access nomina-
tion. The activist public pension funds and labor funds may not 
have sufficient shares, and mutual funds and other institutions may 
not be willing to make a nomination. Instead, it may be both easier 
and more promising to make a Rule 14a-8 proposal forcing these 
companies to adopt a majority standard for director election. 
Third, it is not at all certain that recalcitrant companies would 
respond positively to the possible or actual election of a dissident 
director. Truly recalcitrant companies may just ignore the dissident 
director and push her to the sidelines by not putting her on any im-
portant board committee. Other companies may campaign heavily 
against the election of such a director. 
Fourth, even if a minority of dissident directors were to be 
elected to the boards of some of these companies and succeeded in 
inducing some changes, it is unclear whether they will have major 
effects on company value. To be sure, such companies may make 
some actual or perceived improvements in their corporate govern-
ance such as destaggering the board, increasing the number of in-
dependent directors, or reducing excessive management compensa-
tion. But even to the extent that such changes are desirable, their 
effect on company value may be marginal. 
As to changes that are likely to have a more significant impact 
on company value—such as agreeing to a hostile takeover offer, 
replacing management, substantially increasing payouts to share-
holders, or making fundamental changes in operations or strat-
egy—we doubt that a proxy access contest would be sufficient to 
induce them. Rather, for such changes, especially in recalcitrant 
companies, it takes a traditional proxy contest. 
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D. Emergence of New Activist 
Another possibility is that proxy access would spur a new type of 
activism by a new type of activist. Maybe once proxy access is 
available, mutual funds and other large institutional holders who 
have credibility in the market place and are free of conflicts will fi-
nally use the power they have as large shareholders and come to-
gether to improve the way companies are run. Maybe proxy access 
would lead the Vanguards and Fidelities of the investment world to 
add respected and truly independent directors to the boards of 
their portfolio companies and to intervene quickly and aggressively 
when management fails. Maybe a group of professional independ-
ent directors would be assembled who are unaffiliated with dissi-
dent shareholders but have strong reputational reasons to act effec-
tively as shareholder representatives and could easily be 
nominated by dissidents via proxy access. Maybe. But we think this 
is unlikely. 
First, proxy access does not fundamentally change the corporate 
governance structure. Even without proxy access, mutual funds can 
sponsor shareholder resolutions, campaign for withhold votes, run 
an election contest, or ask a company and its nominating commit-
tee to place a certain person on the board. Many nominating com-
mittees will be perfectly happy to nominate a well-qualified and 
willing director candidate suggested by a Vanguard or Fidelity. 
Proxy access affords just one more option for activism. Though dif-
ferent from the existing options, we do not see why this option 
would induce activism by groups of shareholders who, in the past, 
have only become active in very limited circumstances where the 
activism had an immediate and material effect on the share price—
such as pressuring boards not to block a hostile bid or to seek a 
higher price in a friendly merger. 
Second, we do not think that most mutual funds are structured 
to become activists. Mutual funds largely compete on the basis of 
offering diversification, low expenses, and superior stock selection 
ability. They do not specialize in improving operations. Mutual 
funds like Third Avenue, which are more activist, behave like ac-
tivist hedge funds: they identify companies with operational or 
strategic problems, take a significant equity stake, and then work 
to make improvements. But those mutual funds that specialize in 
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activism will, just like hedge funds, prefer to pursue more expen-
sive routes which offer higher chances of success. 
Third, mutual funds have been, and will remain, reluctant to put 
their own portfolio managers or other employees on the board of 
portfolio companies. Having such directors would arguably give 
the fund access to non-public information, which would greatly im-
pede its ability to trade in the company’s stock. Mutual funds, of 
course, could nominate an unaffiliated outsider to the board. But 
even if a competent outsider could be found, it is unclear how 
much difference her presence on the board would make. If the 
presence of the dissident nominee makes little difference, why 
even bother nominating one? 
Finally, the notion that mutual funds would commence waging 
successful proxy access contests requires significant leaps of faith. 
As discussed in Part II, mutual funds led not a single traditional 
contest between 2005 and 2009. Moreover, hedge funds and indi-
viduals who have started contests would have had a much lower 
success rate had they used proxy access rather than traditional con-
tests. The notion that mutual funds will now wage successful con-
tests via proxy access requires one to believe that (i) mutual funds 
would have been highly successful in the past had they waged tradi-
tional contests (and will thus remain reasonably successful even if 
they wage proxy access contests); (ii) funds nevertheless did not 
wage any traditional contests because the costs outweighed the 
benefits for every single fund and every single portfolio company; 
and (iii) the small reduction in costs generated by proxy access will 
change this calculus even though proxy access contests entail a 
lower likelihood of success. We are skeptical that anyone seriously 
holds these views.  
In sum, we are highly doubtful that proxy access would be the 
start of a new dawn in mutual fund activism. If proxy access does 
anything, it would be an additional, but largely ineffective weapon 
in the toolbox of those investors who were already engaged in ac-
tivism before the passage of proxy access. 
CONCLUSION 
There is something seductive about “ballot access” for share-
holders. After all, as Chancellor Allen noted over 20 years ago, 
“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
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which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”233 Perhaps the 
ideological status of shareholder voting explains the vehemence of 
the battle over proxy access and has clouded the views of the parti-
sans on both sides to the fact that proxy access would have minimal 
practical significance. 
Any incremental reform to increase shareholder access to the 
corporate proxy must be evaluated against the backdrop of the ex-
isting structures and players in corporate governance. The impact 
of proxy access can only be understood in comparison to tradi-
tional proxy fights and other modes of shareholder involvement, 
including “just vote no” campaigns and shareholder proposals. 
When one takes account of institutional detail, it becomes clear 
that, for multiple reasons, neither the proxy access rule adopted by 
the SEC nor any revised rule is likely to be important. Very few 
shareholders will qualify for proxy access. Of those who would 
qualify, the most important ones—mutual funds, private pension 
funds, and many public pension funds—have shown no taste for 
this type of activism. Even for those shareholders interested in ac-
tivism, and even if shareholders not presently interested were to 
develop an interest, proxy access entails severe disadvantages. 
Thus, traditional proxy fights and other modes of shareholder in-
volvement would often represent far better options for challenging 
incumbent management. Shareholders who do use proxy access 
would thus reveal themselves as busybodies, unserious about win-
ning elections but all too happy to stir up publicity and contro-
versy. What then, fellow shareholders may wonder, is their motiva-
tion? A union-affiliated fund may be seeking to advance labor 
interests. A social responsibility fund may be seeking publicity for 
its causes. Public pension funds may be pursuing political goals and 
publicity for board members who are elected officials or may be 
acting at the behest of union representatives on the fund’s board. 
The inherent strategic disadvantages of proxy access, coupled with 
these concerns, mean that the few initiated contests would likely 
fail. As long as companies understand this, the threat of using 
proxy access would not be an effective tool to extract concessions. 
But ultimately, the insignificance of proxy access turns on a 
more fundamental issue. According to urban legend, the famous 
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bank robber Willie Sutton, when asked why he was robbing banks, 
answered: “Because that’s where the money is.”234 Willie Sutton 
has a lot to teach to proponents of proxy access. Even if all the 
other problems of proxy access could be magically overcome, it 
would still have a limited impact for one simple reason: the cost 
savings targeted by proxy access are not where the money is. Direc-
tor election contests involve complex issues, much more than 
shareholder proposals and withhold campaigns. The cost savings 
entailed by proxy access involve such a small part of the expenses it 
takes to wage a serious contest, and such a small fraction of the 
stake of any dissident who would be taken seriously, that it is im-
plausible that they would generate large effects. 
Shareholder activists who support proxy access are barking up 
the wrong tree if they think that a proxy access rule is a useful way 
to energize board governance. At best, it is symbolic politics in a 
world in which there are already easier, cheaper, and more effec-
tive measures such as targeted “withhold vote” campaigns. 
A more serious means to invigorate shareholder voting would 
provide a mechanism to reimburse successful dissidents—and per-
haps even those who gain high levels, but less than a majority of, 
shareholder support—for all or part of their reasonable campaign 
expenses. That’s where the money is. The recently enacted Section 
113 of the Delaware General Corporate Law provides a roadmap 
for shareholders who want to adopt bylaws to provide for such re-
imbursement.235 Rather than waste their time and energy on proxy 
access, shareholder activists could have developed model bylaw 
provisions and pushed boards to adopt them. The SEC, in turn, 
could have taken the much less controversial step of revising its 
rules to make sure that such bylaw amendments could be intro-
duced as Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals without violating the 
various procedural limitations (such as the 500-word limit of such 
proposals). Reimbursement that is contingent on success, but that 
covers a much greater share of expenses than those avoided by 
proxy access, would encourage those shareholders who have a real 
shot yet hold the publicity seekers at bay. Whether such a rule 
 
234 See generally, Willie Sutton, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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would improve corporate governance or increase the value of firms 
is beyond the scope of this Article, but at least such a rule could 
make a real difference in getting shareholder nominees elected to 
corporate boards. 
